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Notes 
FACEBOOKING FROM THE GREAT BEYOND:  
THE PUSH TO AMEND INDIANA’S STATUTE 
FOR OBTAINING ACCESS TO DIGITAL 
ASSETS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the many social media sites used today, Facebook is the leader 
in the social media market with 1.55 billion users worldwide.1  Ashley, like 
many other teens her age, was very active on social media, regularly 
updating her status and posting pictures.2  In December of 2010, Ashley 
unexpectedly died in a car accident, leaving her single mom, Barbara, 
devastated.  Reeling from the loss of her only child, Barbara took comfort 
in accessing Ashley’s Facebook—first by reading Ashley’s old messages 
and viewing pictures.  Later, Barbara began removing comments from 
Ashley’s profile page, updating Ashley’s status, changing her profile 
pictures, and most egregiously, messaging and posting on people’s 
profiles.  Seemingly, Barbara assumed Ashley’s identity.  Facebook 
viewed Barbara’s actions as a breach of Ashley’s privacy.  In response, 
                                                
1 See Leading Social Networks Worldwide as of January 2016, Ranked by Number of Active Users, 
STATISTA (2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-
ranked-by-number-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/JZP8-5FWF] (providing that Facebook is 
the leader in social media focused on constant interaction between friends and family 
through its ability to post statuses and pictures). 
2 This is a hypothetical situation inspired by a news article about Becky Palmer, who died 
of brain tumor at the age of nineteen.  Alison Smith, Facebook Banned Me from My Dead 
Daughter’s Page to Protect Her Privacy:  Mother’s Anguish after Teenager Dies of Brain Tumour, 
DAILY MAIL (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2110019/Facebook-
banned-dead-daughters-page-Mothers-anguish-locked-brain-tumour-teenagers-site-web-
giant.html [https://perma.cc/7S4Z-W7JM] [hereinafter A. Smith].  Louise Palmer, Becky’s 
mother, began to login to Becky’s account to gain comfort in the recent weeks after her 
daughter’s death.  Id.  Louise would login to the account and read messages her daughter 
had sent before her death, and Louise would update Becky’s profile picture.  Id.  Facebook 
later found out, through notifications from Becky’s Facebook friends, about Louise accessing 
the Facebook account, and changed the password, prohibiting access, as well as 
memorializing the account.  Id.  Another example to consider is that of Mac Tonnies.  Rob 
Walker, Cyberspace When You’re Dead, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/magazine/09Immortality-t.html?_r=2 
[https://perma.cc/UG77-NZR2].  Tonnies was an avid blogger who, on October 18, 2009, 
died of a heart condition after posting his final blog posts, tweets, and private messages from 
Twitter.  Id.  Tonnies lived most of his life online through his blog, which allowed him to 
make contacts and friends virtually.  Id.  Tonnies left behind his parents, who did not have 
any idea of or contact with his digital life.  Id. 
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Facebook changed Ashley’s login password and memorialized the 
account so Barbara could no longer access it.  Like many other millennials, 
Ashley did not have a will in place or a plan for what would happen to 
her social media accounts after her death, thus, there was no way to 
determine if Ashley consented to her mother’s actions.3  Indiana allows 
personal representatives of the deceased’s estate to contact the custodian 
of the social media site to petition for access to the social media account.4  
For Ashley’s mother, who lived in Indiana, the statute allowed Barbara to 
petition Facebook to delete or memorialize the profile.5 
Currently, Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1 allows a third party to 
intercede into the contractual relationship between the social media 
account holder and the social media site.6  Allowing access to 
electronically stored information under the Indiana statute ignores 
contract law and allows third parties to gain access to social media 
accounts of deceased users.7  The accounts are contracts between two 
                                                
3 See 15 Economic Facts About Millennials, COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS (Oct. 2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9WG6-7MRJ] (defining millennials as individuals born between 1980 and 
mid-2000).  Millennials, who make up at least one-third of the population, are the largest 
generation within the United States today.  Id. 
4 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (2016) (stating that an individual’s estate, so long as the 
individual lived in Indiana at the time of his or her death, would be permitted to contact the 
social media site to gain access to the deceased’s account). 
5 See id. (reiterating that the Indiana statute to access electronically stored information 
applies only to individuals who are domiciled in Indiana at the time of their death; therefore, 
the personal representative of the estate of the deceased is able to contact the social media 
site for access). 
6 See id. (introducing the Indiana statute allowing for the personal representative to access 
the electronically stored information or documents, which current legislation is defining, of 
a deceased individual).  The Indiana statute’s current language is: 
A custodian shall provide to the personal representative of the estate of 
a deceased person, who was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the 
person’s death, access to or copies of any documents or information of 
the deceased person stored electronically by the custodian upon receipt 
by the custodian of:  (1) a written request for access or copies made by 
the personal representative, accompanied by a copy of the death 
certificate and a certified copy of the personal representative’s letters 
testamentary; or (2) an order of the court having probate jurisdiction of 
the deceased person’s estate. 
Id. 
7 See id. (asserting that the Indiana statute allows access to a social media account without 
respecting the contractual agreement between the social media site and the deceased user); 
see also Natalie M. Banta, Inherit the Cloud:  The Role of Private Contracts in Distributing or 
Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 830 (2014) (illustrating Indiana is not 
the only state that has enacted a statute of this kind; there are five other states that have 
enacted statutes that allow a personal representative of a deceased’s estate to request, from 
a custodian, electronically stored documents or information:  Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Oklahoma, Idaho, and Delaware); Gerry W. Beyer, Florida Passes Digital Account Access Bill, 
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parties, and the representative of the estate should not be permitted to 
petition for access because it would be a violation of the user’s privacy and 
the contractual relationship.8 
To prevent access by the decedent’s estate to social media accounts, 
this Note proposes an amendment to the current Indiana statute excluding 
access to electronically stored information, particularly social media.9  
First, Part II establishes an understanding of social media, lists how social 
media accounts create a contractual relationship, and highlights case law 
to evidence this finding.10  Second, Part III examines the importance of 
distinguishing how social media accounts create a contractual relationship 
that terminates upon the death of the user and how this understanding 
aligns with federal and state law.11  Third, Part IV introduces an 
amendment to the Indiana statute and suggests the Indiana legislature 
implement the proposed amendment to disallow access to a personal 
                                                
WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF. BLOG (Feb. 25, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
trusts_estates_prof/2016/02/florida-passes-digital-account-access-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3FN-CY3P] (lending that Florida is taking steps to create a statute like 
the current six states to allow access to deceased individual’s digital assets); Gerry W. Beyer, 
Wisconsin Latest State to Consider Digital Account Access Legislation, WILLS, TR. & EST. PROF. 
BLOG (Feb. 27, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/trusts_estates_prof/2016/02/ 
wisconsin-latest-state-to-consider-digital-account-access-legislation.html 
[https://perma.cc/P234-FZU8] (finding that Wisconsin is the latest state to consider 
legislation to allow access to digital assets after the user’s death). 
8 See infra Part III (exploring the issues with giving the personal representative of a 
deceased’s estate access under the current statute to electronically stored information or 
documents in the context of contract law, probate law, and the applicable federal and state 
law); see also Tracy Sears, Family Lawmakers Push for Facebook Changes Following Son’s Suicide, 
WTVR (Jan. 9, 2013), http://wtvr.com/2013/01/08/legislation-introduced-for-access-to-
deceased-persons-digital-property/ [https://perma.cc/GBQ5-AUE2] (citing the privacy 
policy that does not allow access to anyone who is not the account holder, even if it is for the 
access to a deceased minor’s account). 
9 See infra Part IV (introducing a proposed amendment to the Indiana statute in which 
access to electronically stored information or documents would be removed from the statute 
and not allowed under Indiana Code § 29-1-13-1.1). 
10 See infra Part II (detailing the context of social media as a digital asset, common law 
contract law, specifically adhesion contracts, and the federal and state law that govern social 
media accounts and potential access to social media accounts). 
11 See infra Part III (establishing that a social media account is an adhesion contract and 
not personal property of the social media account holder); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 
F. Supp. 2d 829, 838 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (prompting that Facebook, a social media site, is a 
contract of adhesion that was formed through a combination of a click-wrap agreement and 
browse-wrap agreement).  Fteja was a Facebook account holder who alleged Facebook 
disabled his account because of his religion and ethnicity.  Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 831.  
Facebook disabled Fteja’s account without his knowledge or notice.  Id.  The claim in Fteja is 
based on a litigation clause in which the forum had been preselected in the Terms of Service 
of Facebook.  Id. at 833.  The case discusses the way in which the contract between Facebook 
and Fteja was created, what type of contract was created, as well as if the contract was valid.  
Id. 
Cates: Facebooking from the Great Beyond: The Push to Amend Indiana's St
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
72 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51 
representative.12  Finally, Part V concludes that the proposed amendment 
will allow social media accounts to die with the account holder, 
preventing access by a third party and ensuring that the sanctity of 
contracting is maintained.13 
II.  BACKGROUND 
With seventy-four percent of adults on the Internet using social 
media, social media is quickly becoming the preferred communication 
method, with worldwide users reaching almost two billion in 2015.14  
Determining what should happen to social media accounts after the death 
of the user is difficult because there is little, if any, legal precedent that 
specifically addresses this issue.15  Additionally, discussing post-mortem 
distribution plans is an uncomfortable topic to discuss, which historically 
                                                
12 See infra Part IV (providing the proposed amendment to Indiana Code § 29-1-13-1.1, 
which will not allow social media to be accessed by a personal representative of a deceased’s 
estate). 
13 See infra Part V (concluding this Note by reiterating social media is a contractual 
relationship between the social media user and the social media account custodian, and there 
should be a statutory amendment to prevent third party interference); see also John Conner, 
Comment, Digital Life After Death:  The Issue of Planning for a Person’s Digital Assets after Death, 
3 EST. PLAN. & COMM. PROP. L.J. 301, 303 (2011) (establishing digital assets have befuddled 
legal scholars for years as a concept and how to apply digital assets to an individual’s estate 
plan when digital communication and storage has become increasingly popular and 
widespread); Matthew T. McClintock, Digital Assets:  Why They Need to Be Part of Your Estate 
Plan, EST. PLANNING.COM (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.estateplanning.com/Digital-Assets-
Why-They-Need-to-Be-Part-of-Your-Estate-Plan/ [https://perma.cc/T2PH-4DTF] 
(highlighting when there is no definite standard for the inheritability of digital assets, social 
media in particular, the accounts are at a high risk for being lost when the account owner 
dies). 
14 See Social Networking Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/VJ3Y-WAB4] [hereinafter Fact 
Sheet] (indicating the percentages of adult users of social media, with a breakdown of users 
based on gender, age, education, and salary); see also Rachel Pinch, Protecting Digital Assets 
after Death:  Issues to Consider in Planning for Your Digital Estate, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 545, 546 
(2014) (giving the statistics of users on social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram); Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, 
STATISTA (2016), http://www.statista.com/statistics/273476/percentage-of-us-population-
with-a-social-network-profile/ [https://perma.cc/6WKD-XVDC] (noting that social media 
usage is continuing to grow both in the United States and worldwide, with an estimated 2.5 
billion users by 2018).  Facebook is the leader in social networking sites used worldwide, and 
it is the first social media platform to have more than one billion users.  Percentage of U.S. 
Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, supra note 14. 
15 See Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-line, 25 PROB. & PROP. 36, 36 (2011) (posing there is 
little law on inheritability of digital assets, such as social media).  Cahn made the comparison 
of digital assets to copyrights because copyrights, like digital assets currently, were seen as 
a question mark in determining whether they could be inherited or passed on through wills 
and will substitutes.  Id. at 37.  However, copyrights are the property of the copyright holder 
and not subject to Terms of Service or use of a social media site.  Id. 
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prevents Internet users from addressing estate planning issues, including 
this unique aspect.16  Nevertheless, intestate and permissible estate 
planning distribution for personal and real property is clear and concise 
within Indiana law.17  However, it is not legally clear who, if anyone, 
should inherit the rights to access the deceased user’s social media 
accounts.18 
Moreover, digital assets and their place in the law continue to stump 
legal scholars and cause estate planners to assume incorrectly that digital 
assets are a form of personal property accessed after the user’s death.19  
The uncertainty has caused estate planners to incorrectly allow access to 
digital assets after the user’s death.20  Allowing access to a social media 
account, as if it is the personal property of the account holder, is not a 
compelling reason because a social media account is created through a 
                                                
16 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 63 (9th ed. 
2013) (highlighting that a large number of the United States population does not plan for the 
future of their property after their death, with this number not including the number of 
people not planning for the future of their digital assets).  A large number of estate planning 
attorneys are now requesting information about their clients’ online life, and what digital 
assets they have, if any.  Cahn, supra note 15, at 36.  An attorney can then advise their clients 
that because many digital assets take the form of license agreements, they can be placed in a 
trust.  Id. at 38.  Once placed in the trust, the digital asset is controlled by a trustee, who then 
manages the digital assets within the trust, just like a piece of real or personal property.  Id. 
17 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (applying the law of succession to give a 
clear understanding of how property is descended from the owner to the heirs or 
descendants); but see Cahn, supra note 15, at 37 (distinguishing that unlike the succession of 
tangible property, like a bank account, digital asset succession under this model would 
encounter issues, such as the access the personal representative is to collect). 
18 See Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (concluding that the issue of what to do with social media 
accounts, along with other digital assets, has just begun to develop, and a concrete answer 
has yet to be found to apply to estate planning and intestacy laws); see also Maeve Duggan, 
The Demographics of Social Media Users, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/08/19/the-demographics-of-social-media-users/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WUQ-R92T] (providing statistics of social media usage as a whole and 
for daily use of social media for all major outlets).  Where seventy percent of Facebook users 
log into their accounts daily, upwards of forty-three percent of people log into Facebook 
multiple times a day.  Duggan, supra note 18. 
19 See, e.g., Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (establishing the idea that applying digital assets 
to an individual’s estate plan, when digital communication and storage has become 
increasingly popular and widespread, has befuddled legal scholars for years as a concept); 
see also McClintock, supra note 13 (finding that ownership of digital assets is at risk when no 
clear standard for inheritability exists). 
20 See Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (confronting the issue that there is no set determination 
of the legal standing of digital assets as personal property or a contract, and whether or not 
the determination relies on the specific digital asset alone for a definition to be determined); 
see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 38 (noting that a general issue that is faced is that online social 
media sites can claim they have the ability to control any potential transfer of the account 
through the Terms of Use or Service). 
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contract.21  This Part explores social media, social media accounts as 
contracts, and federal and state law that governs social media and 
inheritability, or lack thereof.22  First, Part II.A studies social media as a 
digital asset.23  Second, Part II.B discusses social media accounts as 
contracts of adhesion, specifically as click-wrap and browse-wrap 
agreements.24  Finally, Part II.C illustrates the applicable federal and state 
law, which applies to a personal representative’s inability to access the 
social media account after the user’s death.25 
A. Social Media and Its Formation 
With approximately seventy-one percent of adults on social media 
using Facebook, it is the most popular form of social media.26  Individuals 
use social media to create and maintain social ties and relationships with 
friends and family, some of which may have not been able to be sustained 
if not for social media.27  Most users check their social media accounts at 
                                                
21 See infra Part II.B (determining that social media is a contract created by the user 
agreeing to the terms for the particular social media site without having the ability to bargain 
for the best terms for each party). 
22 See infra Part II (exploring how it is determined that social media accounts should not 
be allowed to be accessed by the personal representative of the deceased user’s estate because 
social media accounts are contracts that should end upon the death of the user). 
23 See infra Part II.A (establishing that social media is a term that is unique in its creation 
through contract and that the social media outlet is distinct in its Terms of Use that create 
the contract). 
24 See infra Part II.B (expressing that social media is created through a contract that is 
agreed to by both parties when the new user clicks “I agree” when signing up for the social 
media site, and this type of agreement is a particular type of contract, an adhesion contract, 
which can be broken down again into two types of agreements, click-wrap and browse-wrap 
agreements). 
25 See infra Part II.C (focusing on the applicable federal and state law that applies to social 
media accounts as a digital asset to show that these accounts should cease upon the death of 
the user). 
26 See Fact Sheet, supra note 14 (drawing that Facebook is the most popular form of social 
media, followed by Twitter with twenty-three percent of adults using that form of social 
media); see also Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, 
supra note 14 (pointing out that North America currently has the highest number of social 
media users in the world with fifty-nine percent). 
27 See Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/11/15/why-americans-use-social-media/ 
[https://perma.cc/S4PQ-H4ZP] (finding that the major force behind people becoming social 
media users is the ability to keep in touch with new and old friends, friends that the user has 
fallen out of touch with, and long-distance family members); see also Emily M. Janoski-
Haehlen, The Courts Are All a ‘Twitter’:  The Implications of Social Media Use in the Courts, 46 
VAL. U. L. REV. 43, 43 (2011) (explaining that Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube are 
some of the social media sites that allow for a user to connect with others locally and around 
the world).  These social media sites are used to connect one individual to the rest of the 
world.  Janoski-Haehlen, supra note 27, at 43.  Not only does the user communicate with 
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least seventeen times per day, which on average means at least once every 
hour of the day.28  Aside from its tremendous social utility, social media 
accounts are classified as digital assets along with other online accounts, 
such as Amazon accounts, online banking accounts, and email accounts.29  
Scholars define digital assets as “any file on your computer in a storage 
drive or website and any online account or membership.”30  This 
definition allows items such as Microsoft Word documents, digital 
pictures and videos, and iTunes music to be considered a digital asset of 
the individual who created or bought it.31 
Unlike the aforementioned assets, social media accounts are unique 
because they have their own terms and conditions which users must 
follow.32  For instance, Facebook’s Terms of Service explicitly state that the 
                                                
loved ones near and far, but also people they have never met before the use of social media.  
Id. 
28 See Lulu Chang, Americans Spend an Alarming Amount of Time Checking Social Media on 
Their Phones, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 13, 2015), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/ 
informate-report-social-media-smartphone-use/ [https://perma.cc/8SJP-TY74] 
(demonstrating the vast amount of time that Americans check their phones to either monitor 
or update their social media accounts); see also Percentage of U.S. Population with a Social 
Network Profile from 2008 to 2016, supra note 14 (rendering that while the current number of 
people in the United States using social media in 2016 is about 185 million people, the future 
number is estimated to be over 200 million people by 2020). 
29 See Margaret Van Houten, Assets to Assets, Dust to Dust:  What to Do with a Decedent’s 
Digital Identity, 30 A.L.I. A.B.A. 581, 586 (2013) (giving a broad definition of what creates the 
digital asset category); see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (highlighting that there are different 
types and categories of digital assets:  personal, social media, financial, and business). 
30 See Conner, supra note 13, at 303 (noting that there is currently not a definition of digital 
assets in the legal dictionary, which leads to legal scholars and practitioners lacking an 
understanding of what a digital asset is and allowing them to come up with their own 
definition); see also Van Houten, supra note 29, at 586 (defining digital assets); see also Cahn, 
supra note 15, at 36 (reiterating that digital assets are thought of through different categories, 
such as personal assets, social media, financial assets, and business assets). 
31 See Van Houten, supra note 29, at 586–87 (illustrating that digital assets take on many 
forms, some of which are documents created by individuals who have passed); see also 
Lumturije Akiti, Facebook off Limits?  Protecting Teachers’ Private Speech on Social Networking 
Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2012) (exposing that social media has revolutionized the 
way in which communication over the Internet, and in general, is conducted).  Facebook and 
other social media sites are becoming a substitute for communication from regular phone 
calls and even texts.  Akiti, supra note 31, at 121–22.  The growth of Facebook, from being 
open to college students to the world, shows how much of an integral part of communication 
social media has become.  Id. 
32 See, e.g., Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/ 
legal/terms [https://perma.cc/VS2P-NGWC] [hereinafter FACEBOOK] (canvasing the terms 
required to use Facebook and post on the site, which each new user must agree to before 
using the social media site); see also Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM (Jan. 19, 2013), 
https://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ [https://perma.cc/A7JN-FJRA] [hereinafter 
INSTAGRAM] (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to the Instagram social media 
account); Terms of Service, TWITTER (May 18, 2015), https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en 
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terms in the document bind the user’s presence on Facebook.33  Facebook 
defines how to use the account and set up the account to ensure privacy 
for the user, while maintaining a license over the content posted on the 
site.34  The terms bind the Facebook user with no opportunity to 
negotiate.35  Only the individual who signs up for Facebook is deemed 
able to access and use the profile, unless the user and Facebook expressly 
grant permission otherwise.36  The user agrees to any terms the social 
media site deems fit to establish, no matter if one disagrees or later finds 
issue with the terms.37 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/VLC9-NR42] [hereinafter TWITTER] (outlining the Terms of Service for 
potential Twitter users). 
33 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (clarifying that the Terms of Service of Facebook 
should be taken seriously by the user and treated as a binding contract).  The specific 
language of the beginning of the Terms of Service are: 
This Statement of Rights and Responsibilities (“Statement,” “Terms,” or 
“SSR”) derives from the Facebook Principles and is our terms of service 
that governs our relationship with users and others who interact with 
Facebook brands, products and services, which we call the “Facebook 
Services” or “Services.”  By using or accessing the Facebook Services, 
you agree to this Statement, as updated from time to time in accordance 
with Section 13 below.  Additionally, you will find resources at the end 
of this document that help you understand how Facebook works. 
Id. 
34 See id. (“you [,the user,] specifically give us the following permission, subject to your 
privacy and application settings:  you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, 
royalty-free, worldwide license . . . to content that you post on or in connection with 
Facebook.”); see also What is My Profile, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
133986550032744 [https://perma.cc/X85F-UJHY] (issuing that a profile on Facebook is the 
individual’s collection of pictures, stories, and events that tell the user’s life story on 
Facebook); What Is a Facebook Page?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
174987089221178 [https://perma.cc/4UR3-A3ME] (detailing that Facebook pages are used 
in connection with businesses, organizations, and brands to share pictures, posts, and events 
with people who like their page). 
35 See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (construing that the Terms of Service are binding when the 
user signs up and begins to use Facebook for the social networking use for which it was 
designed); see also About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info/ 
?tab=pageinfo [https://perma.cc/4A6T-GNPY] (promoting that Facebook was founded on 
February 4, 2004, and provides general information on Facebook, such as the description and 
the mission statement of Facebook). 
36 See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (outlining a term of Facebook that allows only the Facebook 
profile user to access the individual profile in the individual’s name).  This particular term 
of service specifically states, “You will not transfer your account (including any Page or 
application you administer) to anyone without first getting our [, Facebook’s,] written 
permission.”  Id. 
37 See id. (drawing that the terms create a binding contract and once the user assents to 
them, the user is bound to abide by the terms as they are stated in the Terms of Service); see 
also Nicholas Carlson, At Last—The Full Story of How Facebook Was Founded, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 
5, 2010), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-facebook-was-founded-2010-3 
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Like Facebook, both Twitter and Instagram’s Terms of Use govern the 
user’s actions on the social media sites.38  Twitter’s terms state the site has 
the right to regulate the user’s access and information posted to the 
account.39  These terms bind the user’s usage on the social media site.40  
The Terms of Service require that the terms are considered a contract to 
use the service and advise one not enter into the contract unless one is 
fully capable and ready to abide by the terms.41  Additionally, Instagram’s 
policies are similar to the previous two social media sites.42  When using 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/4NAM-NWBZ] (detailing the controversy surrounding the creation of 
Facebook and its founder, Mark Zuckerberg). 
38 See TWITTER, supra note 32 (reflecting on Twitter’s Terms of Service governing a user’s 
ability to use the social media site and what is posted on the social media site); see also 
INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (noting that the Terms of Use for Instagram allow for Instagram 
to regulate what is posted on its social media site and its ability to use the pictures posted for 
its own use). 
39 See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (outlining what is to be agreed to by a new user, in which 
the terms are similar in nature to those of other social media sites); see also TWITTER, supra 
note 32 (construing that Twitter governs the users on its site and makes this known to new 
users through the Terms of Service).  Twitter construes this to its new users by stating: 
These Terms of Service (“Terms”) govern your access to and use of our 
Services, including our various websites, SMS, APIs, email notifications, 
applications, buttons, widgets, ads, commerce services (the “Twitter 
Services”), and our other covered services that link to these Terms 
(collectively, the “Services”), and any information, text, graphics, photos 
or other materials uploaded, downloaded or appearing on the Services 
(collectively referred to as “Content”).  Your access to and use of the 
Services are conditioned on your acceptance of and compliance with 
these Terms.  By accessing or using the Services you agree to be bound 
by these Terms. 
Id. 
40 See TWITTER, supra note 32 (confirming that by signing up and using the social media 
site, the user agrees to the Terms of Service as they are outlined in the Terms of Service 
hyperlink, which must be clicked on to view the terms); see also New User FAQs, INSTAGRAM 
(2016), https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920 [https://perma.cc/DFY6-8RET] 
(offering that Instagram is a way to share lifetime moments with friends and family, as well 
as the public). 
41 See TWITTER, supra note 32 (confronting that the Terms of Service are a binding contract 
that should only be entered into if the party is willing to accept and abide by the terms as 
they are stated by Twitter); see also Nicholas Carlson, The Real History of Twitter, BUS. INSIDER 
(Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-twitter-was-founded-2011-4 
[https://perma.cc/DZ4S-V8M6] (explaining the real story behind how Twitter started, 
through some ex-Googlers and a failed company that later brought the idea of Twitter to the 
masses). 
42 See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (outlining what is to be agreed to by a new user, which 
are terms similar in nature to those of other social media sites); see also Nicole Cocozza, 
Instagram Sets a Precedent by an “Insta” Change in Social Media Contracts & Users’ Ignorance of 
Instagram’s Terms of Use May Lead to Acceptance by a Simple “Snap,” 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 363, 
364 (2014) (elaborating that users tend to ignore the Terms of Use that the social media service 
offers for its new users to explore and read prior to agreeing to the service); FAQ, INSTAGRAM 
(2016), https://www.instagram.com/about/faq/ [https://perma.cc/M8ML-Y7LP] 
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Instagram, one is agreeing to the terms of Instagram.43  The terms require 
a person to meet a certain age to use Instagram, not post pictures that 
depict violence or nudity, and assume responsibility for any activity that 
may occur under a profile name or handle.44 
Because the concept of inheriting social media accounts is so modern, 
little to no case law exists directly addressing digital assets.45  However, 
the case law that does exist uses contract law to decipher the results of the 
contract after death to understand inheritability.46  Scholars contend that 
Facebook is the primary social media outlet battling conflict when it comes 
to accessing the social media site after the user dies.47  For instance, in Fteja 
                                                
[hereinafter FAQ] (remarking that Instagram is a way to share pictures with friends and 
family by taking a picture with a cell phone then posting it on Instagram).  Another feature 
of Instagram is that the user is allowed to pick a filter for the picture prior to posting it on 
Instagram.  FAQ, supra note 42. 
43 See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (urging that the Terms of Use of Instagram are and should 
be construed to be a binding contract by the new user with Instagram for its social media or 
networking service); see also Lim Yung-Hui, Inspiring Insights by Instagram CEO Kevin 
Systrom, The Man Who Built a $1 Billion Startup, FORBES (Apr. 9, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/limyunghui/2012/04/09/inspiring-insights-by-instagram-
ceo-kevin-systrom-the-man-who-built-a-1-billion-startup/#761452c25f0f 
[https://perma.cc/TRU6-ZSWE] (elaborating on Instagram’s beginning success, and stating 
that recently, Facebook bought Instagram for $1 billion). 
44 See INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 (providing that a user must be of an age to be aware of 
the terms the user is agreeing to when signing up and using the Instagram social media and 
networking service); see also Yung-Hui, supra note 43 (expanding on the story of how 
Instagram started, how it got its name, and how long it took for the creators to develop 
Instagram before it launched). 
45 See Cahn, supra note 15, at 36 (reporting that little has been decided in reference to social 
media, as well as digital assets as a whole category, and its ability to be inherited or devised 
within a will or through intestacy statutes); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 366 (asserting 
that courts have struggled to define social media contracts and the Terms of Service or Use 
within the scope of traditional principles of contract law). 
46 See infra Part II.C (rendering that contract law in relation to its use in forming a contract 
for the social media site and the terms within the contract will render the decision if social 
media can be inherited through probate and intestacy statutes). 
47 See, e.g., Louise Boyle, Grieving Parents Battle Facebook for Access to 15-year-old Son’s Profile 
after He Committed Suicide, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
news/article-2280800/Facebook-bans-parents-accessing-sons-profile-committed-
suicide.html [https://perma.cc/5ED2-DKJ4] (discussing the battle Eric Rash’s parents faced 
in trying to obtain access to their son’s Facebook profile for possible answers after he 
committed suicide); see also Alyssa Bereznak, Delaware Agrees to Let Families Inherit the Social 
Media Accounts of the Deceased, YAHOO! (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.yahoo.com/tech/ 
delaware-agrees-to-let-families-inherit-the-social-95209129124.html 
[https://perma.cc/3UZS-P5BJ] (drawing on the story of Amanda Todd and how her family 
was unable to delete the negative comments, or her Facebook account in general, because 
they did not have access and the legacy option was not available at the time); Ryan Grenoble, 
Amanda Todd:  Bullied Canadian Teen Commits Suicide after Prolonged Battle Online and in School, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/11/amanda-
todd-suicide-bullying_n_1959909.html [https://perma.cc/ZC24-XRND] (telling the story of 
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v. Facebook, the court held that Facebook’s agreement created a valid 
contract using contract of adhesion devises—click-wrap and browse-wrap 
agreements.48  Facebook’s terms do not present the potential user with the 
Terms of Use before requiring a click of consent to the terms.49  Placing the 
link on the welcome page and having people click through creates a 
binding contract whether or not the user of the social media site reads the 
terms.50  As such, by using the site, the user expressly agrees to the terms 
of the site.51  However, it is unclear what would occur to the Facebook 
account after the user dies.52  In Ajemian v. Yahoo!, a personal 
representative of an estate requested access to a Yahoo! account because 
he stated he was a co-user of the account.53  The Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals found that administrators are not entitled to access the account 
                                                
Amanda Todd, a teenage girl who committed suicide after being bullied on Facebook, which 
prompted Facebook to create a memorialization page after her death). 
48 See 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (conceding that the agreement Facebook 
has in place is not a true form of a click-wrap agreement, rather it is a hybrid of a click-wrap 
and browse-wrap).  A click-wrap agreement is one that requires a click of agreement by the 
user to the terms.  Id.  A browse-wrap agreement is where the terms are located in a 
hyperlink, which must be clicked to be viewed before agreement to the terms.  Id. 
49 See id. (providing the terms in a separate link, like Facebook does, is the foundational 
element a browse-wrap agreement); see also Anne Flaherty, What Happens to Your Online 
Accounts When You Die?, DENVER POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.denverpost.com/ 
business/ci_26175560/what-happens-your-online-accounts-when-you-die 
[https://perma.cc/62VE-7Q2P] (offering that most Terms of Service agreements do not 
allow anyone who is not the account holder to access the social media site). 
50 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (visiting Facebook and continuing to use the site is the 
assertion of agreement, which is a browse-wrap agreement); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, 
at 371 (expressing that the rise in social media sites and the contracts that form the social 
media accounts have challenged traditional principles of contract law). 
51 Compare Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (agreeing to the terms is essential to continued use 
of the website); with Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(proposing that a click of assent is not consent, unless the site makes it explicitly clear to the 
user the terms he or she is agreeing to before continuing). 
52 See Ajemian v. Yahoo! Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (pointing out that 
there is no clear rule to indicate if a digital asset of a deceased individual should be accessed 
by the personal representative of the estate); see also Tamara Castagna, Twitter:  Chatter and 
Substance, 21 AUSTL. L. LIBR. 90, 94 (2013) (contrasting the issue of social media from a 
business perspective and how the policies within the social media platform will determine 
how companies use the social media to further their business online). 
53 See 987 N.E.2d at 607 (claiming that one was a part of the contract is not enough, it must 
be documented on the contract who is a party to the contract and who is authorized to access 
the email account); see also Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook Will Now Let You Manage What 
Happens to Your Account after You Die, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/02/12/facebook-will-
now-let-you-manage-what-happens-to-your-account-after-you-die/ 
[https://perma.cc/V36R-8X9H] (detailing the recent addition to Facebook, in which the 
social media site granted users the ability to choose what would happen to their Facebook 
profile after they die:  the profile can be deleted or the profile can be memorialized). 
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of the deceased individual they are administrating, even if the 
administrator is a relative.54  To prevent a personal representative or the 
administrator of an estate access to social media accounts, the formation 
of these accounts as a contract of adhesion evidences the need to prevent 
access.55 
B. Social Media Accounts as Contracts of Adhesion 
Contracts of adhesion are contracts that are standardized, imposed, 
and drafted by the party with the greater bargaining power, requiring the 
party seeking the service to either accept or reject the contract.56  Social 
media accounts are created by contracts of adhesion formed by click-wrap 
agreements, browse-wrap agreements, or a combination of both.57  
Another view of social media, not readily provided by scholars, is that a 
                                                
54 See Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 614 (establishing the rule that even though a relative wants 
access to the digital asset of a deceased loved one, being the personal representative of the 
estate does not establish a valid position to be allowed access); see also Castagna, supra note 
52, at 93 (presenting that with the use of social media, such as Twitter, confidentiality issues 
stem from the amount of information that the user posts online). 
55 See infra Part II.B (detailing that the creation of social media accounts as contracts of 
adhesion furthers the argument that access by a third party representative of the deceased’s 
estate should not be permitted). 
56 See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (defining a contract of adhesion in a cellphone plan as a take it or leave it 
contract with only the opportunity to accept or reject the contract); see also Fiederlein v. 
Boutselis, 952 N.E.2d 847, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that a contract requires offer, 
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds between the parties to properly form 
a contract).  When a contract is formed in the traditional way, there is no disparity in 
bargaining power between the two parties.  Fiederlein, 952 N.E.2d at 856.  Each party to the 
contract has the opportunity to bargain and make counteroffers.  Id.  This is the basic 
formation of a contract, but social media accounts are not created in this way.  Id.  Social 
media accounts are created through contracts, which are different in formation and in 
bargaining power; parties are still required to assent to the terms, but fewer seem to be 
required.  Id.  There is no need for offer, acceptance, and consideration because a potential 
new user must agree to the Terms of Service as they are for everyone who chooses to use the 
social media site.  Id.  See also Houston v. Hyatt Regency Indianapolis, 997 F. Supp. 2d 914, 
922 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (showing that the basic building blocks of a contract “include offer, 
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds” between the parties forming the 
contract); cf. Econ. Leasing Co., Ltd. v. Wood, 427 N.E.2d 483, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (stating 
that a meeting of the minds was not required to find a breach of contract); Weaver v. Am. 
Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 1971) (noting that a traditional contract is formed as a result 
of bargaining among the parties to the contract when both have equal bargaining power, or 
when no one party has more power over the other). 
57 See Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 614 (comprehending that contracts can be formed differently, 
using both agreements in an adhesion contract, to create a binding contractual relationship 
between the site and the non-user); see also Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d 
ed. 2006) (defining “adhesion contract” as “[a] standard-form contract prepared by one 
party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres 
to the contract with little choice about the terms”). 
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social media account is a contractual relationship between the user and 
the social media parent site.58  Moreover, in Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the contract to become a member 
of a spa and gym was an adhesion contract.59  The contract for the gym 
service was comprised of a printed form, which was consistent with other 
gym contracts and was the same contract every member was required to 
sign before joining the gym.60  The court reasoned there was no disparity 
between the bargaining powers of the parties.61 
In addition, contracts of adhesion are found in two forms—click-wrap 
and browse-wrap agreements.62  Click-wrap agreements are contracts 
which require a user to click an “I agree” box when signing up for a 
service.63  Within the social media context, a user must consent to the terms 
                                                
58 Compare Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (pointing out 
that Facebook is a contract that is created when the new user agrees to the terms before 
setting up a profile), with Fiederlein, 952 N.E.2d at 856 (admitting that there is a distinction 
between traditional contract formation and contracts that are created through adhesion, in 
particular the meeting of the minds and bargaining relationship associated with creating the 
contract).  It is the view in Fteja that many scholars do not give credit to.  Rather, scholars 
view social media and posts on social media as the personal property of the individual, 
which allows for social media to be considered a portion of the estate of the deceased 
individual. 
59 See 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (issuing that the contract was a form contract, 
which the gym created for all potential new members to agree to and sign before beginning 
working out at Spa Petite); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 376 (identifying that the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) has a set of rules for electronic contracting to avoid 
issues, which are:  (1) the user must have notice that terms exist; (2) the user has an 
opportunity to review the terms; (3) the user has notice that taking an optional action is 
assent; and (4) the user must have taken the optional action).  Click-wrap agreements are 
agreements that fully satisfy each of these rules set out by the ABA.  Cocozza, supra note 42, 
at 376. 
60 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 921 (expressing that the contract Schlobohm signed, 
consisting of four pages outlining the terms and conditions of the gym, which were all on 
the first page so the new member would see them); see also James Grimmelmann, Saving 
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009) (relying that with the contract comes privacy 
issues because of the amount of information required to set-up a complete social media 
profile). 
61 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (holding that the contract for the Spa Petite gym 
service was an adhesion contract drafted by Spa Petite); see also Cocozza, supra note 42, at 375 
(providing an example of one online adhesion contract, a browse-wrap contract, which 
requires a user to click on a link with the Terms of Use at the bottom of the page). 
62 See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (determining that 
there are different types of Internet agreements that are important to know and note for a 
better understanding of social media contracting); see also Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 
763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014) (detailing that contracts on the Internet take two forms, 
click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, and detailing that Barnes & Noble’s terms and 
conditions, which constituted a browse-wrap agreement, must be agreed to before 
purchasing a product online). 
63 See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (claiming that the agreement with Google required 
the new user to manifest his or her intent by clicking the “I agree” button on the page to 
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of the social media site before proceeding through the process and 
participating in the social media site.64  For example, Facebook, Twitter, 
and Instagram all have elements that are examples of click-wrap 
agreements because they require the user to click “agree” before allowing 
the user to proceed with creating an account or profile.65 
More specifically, on Facebook, to agree and continue to create a 
Facebook profile, the potential new user must click the “Sign Up” button 
before proceeding through the process to create a profile.66  The click of 
“Sign Up” is the assent element for a click-wrap agreement.67  However, 
Facebook does not provide the presentation of the actual Terms of Use for 
the potential new user in the true click-wrap agreement.68  Thus, Facebook 
                                                
make the Terms of Use or service binding on the parties to the contract); see also Cocozza, 
supra note 42, at 376 (inferring that the click-wrap agreement requires the potential user to 
fully scroll through the terms to prevent any potential notice issues a user may claim, which 
is the problem with browse-wrap agreements). 
64 See Feldman, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 236 (requiring a user to agree to the terms before 
proceeding through the sign up process makes the user read and agree to the terms to which 
the user must abide); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 821 (ordering that a user must click on 
the dialogue box to agree to the agreement or contract, or be unable to continue setting up 
the social media profile). 
65 See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing that a click-wrap 
agreement “presents the potential licensee with a message on his or her computer screen, 
requiring that the user manifest his or her assent to the terms of the license agreement by 
clicking on an icon”)); see also Zaltz v. JDate, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 451 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(following that the user of the online dating site must click agree before proceeding through 
to set up the user’s online dating profile).  In order to sign up for JDate, Zaltz had to 
repeatedly click on boxes agreeing to certain terms of the online dating site.  Zaltz, 952 F. 
Supp. 2d at 451.  Zaltz’s inability to recall agreeing to these terms was unpersuasive to the 
court to negate and invalidate the browse-wrap and click-wrap combination adhesion 
contract.  Id.  The agreement in this particular case is analogous to the agreement in Fteja, 
which the court in this case heavily relied upon to come to its decision.  Id. 
66 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (stating that the user must agree to the terms by clicking 
the agree button to create a Facebook profile and use the social media service the site 
provides); see also FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (outlining the terms and conditions a user agrees 
to when he or she signs up for a Facebook profile). 
67 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (asserting that clicking agree is the electronic equivalent 
of a signature on a traditional contract); see also Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (rendering that 
the Second Circuit has found that assent to the contractual terms not only requires 
agreement, but the Terms of Use or Service must be given to the user in clear notice of the 
terms). 
68 See Zaltz, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 452 (describing that a true click-wrap agreement presents 
the terms and conditions to be agreed to on the same page as the agree button, not in a 
separate link or page that the user has to visit to read the terms); see also Robert V. Hale II, 
Recent Developments in Online Consumer Contracts, 71 BUS. LAW. 353, 357–58 (Winter 2015–
2016) (commenting that the correct standard to follow in regards to a user agreeing to the 
terms is that of the reasonable person standard, or the consumer must know what he or she 
is assenting to). 
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falls short on being purely a click-wrap agreement.69  In Fteja, the court 
held that Facebook’s agreement did not meet the true meaning and 
definition of a click-wrap agreement.70  Facebook did not present the 
potential user with the Terms of Use before requiring a click of assent to 
the terms.71  Rather, the court held that Facebook utilized a combination 
of a click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements.72 
Under a true browse-wrap agreement, a user does not see the Terms 
of Use before clicking sign up or continuing to use the social media site.73  
This foundation that a browse-wrap agreement is built on means the user 
does not view any terms before continuing on the website.74  Placing the 
link on the welcome page and having people physically click through the 
terms creates a binding contract, regardless of whether the user of the 
                                                
69 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837–38 (cautioning that Facebook is not true form of a click-
wrap agreement because Facebook fails to provide the terms on the same webpage where 
the agree button is located); see also Hale, supra note 68, at 357 (declining to follow the 
precedent set out in Fteja because the case mischaracterized the importance of the reasonable 
person standard to notice that clicking agree is assenting to the terms of the social media 
site). 
70 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (conceding that the agreement Facebook has in place is 
not a true form of a click-wrap agreement, rather it is a hybrid of a click-wrap and browse-
wrap); see also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord Coke to Internet Privacy:  
The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 466–67 
(2013) (admitting that a classic browse-wrap agreement may be thought of as a “pay now, 
terms later transaction,” where the terms are hyperlinked on the home page of the website); 
Cheryl B. Preston, “Please Note:  You Have Waived Everything”:  Can Notice Redeem Online 
Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 547 (2015) (pointing out that scholars and courts have been 
unsure as to the distinction that may or may not be made between click-wrap and browse-
wrap agreements). 
71 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (providing the terms in a separate link, like Facebook 
does, is the foundational element of a browse-wrap agreement); see also Moringiello & 
Reynolds, supra note 70, at 468 (deciding that courts are favoring the approach of 
determining the conscionability of the contract rather than basing the decision of 
enforceability on whether the contract is a click-wrap or browse-wrap agreement). 
72 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (reasoning that Facebook is a combination because the 
terms and conditions are available via a link, which is the browse-wrap element, but 
agreement to the terms is required by clicking agree, which is the click-wrap element); see 
also Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 70, at 469 (presenting that the actual focus of 
discussion should be on the presentation of the terms and not on the distinction between 
click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements). 
73 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (accessing the terms via a link is the classic form of a 
browse-wrap agreement).  When Fteja signed up for the service, he had a duty to click the 
link to read the terms before clicking agree to continue signing up for Facebook.  Id.  
Hyperlinking the terms is how a browse-wrap agreement creates a binding agreement, 
which is many times overlooked by the potential new user.  Id. 
74 See id. (manifesting a browse-wrap agreement by continuing to use the site whether or 
not the new user read the terms in the hyperlink for the website); see also Preston, supra note 
70, at 547 (confirming that a large and increasing number of courts are continuing to uphold 
and enforce browse-wrap agreements, which the user does not see the terms of the contract 
before using the website). 
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social media site reads the terms.75  Facebook and other similar sites put 
on their websites that when using the site for social networking, the user 
is consenting to the site’s Terms of Use.76  Thus, when a user posts any 
picture or statement, the user is manifesting his or her agreement to all of 
the terms of the browse-wrap, click-wrap combination contract of 
adhesion.77 
Browse-wrap agreements are seen on sites where one purchases an 
item or browses a website for its content because the terms are generally 
listed on the webpage.78  For example, in Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, the 
plaintiff’s suit focused on a portion of the Terms of Use of the website that 
the plaintiff agreed to when placing his order online.79  The court found 
the Terms of Use was a browse-wrap agreement because the terms were 
implied when visiting the Barnes & Noble website to place an order, and 
the terms were located in a hyperlink at the bottom of the webpage.80  The 
                                                
75 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (visiting Facebook and continuing to use the site is the 
assertion of an agreement which is one component of a browse-wrap agreement); see also 
Preston, supra note 70, at 561 (providing an example of a browse-wrap agreement in that the 
binding mechanism is when “you visit or shop at Amazon.com”) (emphasis in original). 
76 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (discussing the terms a new user agrees to when 
signing up for Facebook); see also Helen Glaberson, Who Gets Your Facebook When You Die?, 
GOOD HOUSEKEEPING (July 31, 2015), http://www.goodhousekeeping.com/life/ 
a33700/facebook-legacy-feature/ [https://perma.cc/7JDU-LGQS] (introducing that in 
February 2015, Facebook established a new feature in its Terms of Service that allows a user 
to choose who can manage the account after the user dies).  By manage, Facebook does not 
mean that the individual the user chooses has full access to the profile like the user had when 
alive, but rather the individual has the ability to tell Facebook to memorialize the account or 
delete it.  Glaberson, supra note 76.  Nowhere within this new addition to its policy does 
Facebook give the third party the ability to take on the account as his or her own account, 
like Ashley’s mother did in Part I of this Note.  Id. 
77 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 838 (reiterating that Facebook, as an adhesion contract, is a 
combination of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements); see also John Bonazzo, Do You Need 
to Control Your Online Identity after Your Death?, OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2016), 
http://observer.com/2016/02/how-to-control-your-online-life-after-you-die/ 
[https://perma.cc/9LKK-TP2N] (asserting that access must be given to the third party 
before the original user’s death or else there will criminal liability). 
78 See Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating browse-
wrap agreements are in pure form when a website states that by using the site you are 
manifesting agreement to the Terms of Use or service of that particular site).  Barnes & Noble, 
which is the website in the case, is an example of this type of agreement in that the user 
agrees to the terms by browsing the website for books or other goods sold online.  Id. 
79 See id. (finding that the issue with the Barnes & Noble adhesion contract was that there 
was no actual notice to the customer, which courts have consistently required with browse-
wrap agreements to be held valid and not unconscionable).  The plaintiff ordered a tablet off 
of the Barnes & Noble website and was later notified his purchase had been cancelled 
because the order could not be filled due to the tablet being sold out.  Id. 
80 See id. (indicating the type of agreement Barnes & Noble had on its website would bind 
its customers to its terms, but lacked the notice required for the agreement to be legally sound 
and binding for the customer); see also Cahn, supra note 15, at 38 (allowing another individual 
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held there must be something more than 
a hyperlink placed on the page to let the user know that the terms exist 
and that the user is agreeing to them by visiting the site.81 
Nevertheless, contracts of adhesion carry a stigma of being 
unconscionable because of the disparity in the bargaining power between 
the parties.82  For any contract to be unconscionable, there must be a 
presence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability.83  
Procedural unconscionability “focuses on the manner in which the 
contract was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties.”84  
                                                
to access a social media account, or more broadly a digital asset account, would violate the 
social media agreement); but cf. Tsukayama, supra note 53 (declaring that Facebook now has 
an option for its users to name who they would like to have control over their Facebook 
account after they die for a short amount of time, only to determine if the account should be 
deleted or memorialized). 
81 See Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1178–79 (stating knowledge that the terms are located on the 
page or through a hyperlink is required to bind the user to the Terms of Use or Service of the 
social media site).  The court specifically stated in its holding: 
[W]e therefore hold that where a website makes its terms of use 
available via a conspicuous hyperlink on every page of the website but 
otherwise provides no notice to users nor prompts them to take an 
affirmative action to demonstrate assent, even close proximity of the 
hyperlink to relevant buttons users must click on—without more—is 
insufficient to give rise to constructive notice.  While failure to read a 
contract before agreeing to its terms does not relieve party of its 
obligations under the contract . . . the onus must be on website owners 
to put users on notice of the terms to which they wish to bind 
consumers. 
Id. 
82 See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (providing that a contract of adhesion comes with the battle to prove that 
the contract is conscionable and therefore enforceable); see also Unconscionability, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “unconscionability” as “[t]he principle that a court 
may refuse to enforce a contract that is unfair or oppressive because of procedural abuses 
during contract formation or because of overreaching contractual terms, esp[ecially] terms 
that are unreasonably favorable to one party while precluding meaningful choice for the 
other party”). 
83 See Bradberry, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (issuing that a finding of unconscionability in an 
adhesion contract for a service must include both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability; however, if one is more present than the other, the court may hold the 
contract unconscionable if the court determines it to be substantial).  In Bradberry, Bradberry 
argued that T-Mobile reuses cellphone numbers after charging the subscriptions of the 
previous owner of that cell phone number.  Id. at *1.  The contract for the phone service was 
a contract that was the same for each customer, and to overcome and invalidate the adhesion 
contract, Bradberry claimed the contract was unconscionable.  Id. 
84 See id. at *4 (illustrating the meaning of the requirement of procedural unconscionability 
in order to determine that a contract is void); see also Procedural Unconscionability, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “procedural unconscionability” as 
“[u]nconscionability resulting from improprieties in contract formation (such as oral 
misrepresentations or disparities in bargaining position) rather than from the terms of the 
contract itself”). 
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Substantive unconscionability refers to the contractual language.85  In 
addition to the procedural and substantive requirements, another factor 
used by the courts is to look at the service provided.86  If the service is a 
public service or an essential service, the service is necessary.87  If the 
service is not a necessity, it generally means that the service can be found 
somewhere else.88  Services that are commonly categorized as public 
necessities are hospitals and consulting a doctor or lawyer.89 
While social media accounts are created through a valid, conscionable 
contract, many scholars and estate planning attorneys incorrectly 
categorize social media as personal property.90  The court in Nelson v. La 
                                                
85 See Bradberry, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (declaring the focus on what is required for 
substantive unconscionability); see also Substantive Unconscionability, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “substantive unconscionability” as “[u]nconscionability 
resulting from contract terms that are unduly harsh, commercially unreasonable, and grossly 
unfair given the existing circumstances”). 
86 See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (illustrating that 
providing a gym membership and exercise training is not an essential service); see also 
Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 70, at 469 (advocating that procedural unconscionability 
alone is not enough to find a contract unconscionable; there must be some finding of 
substantive unconscionability, even if it is not as great as procedural). 
87 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (reasoning that if a service is essential and there is 
unequal bargaining power and the terms of the contract strongly favor one party, the court 
will tend to find unconscionability and the contract will be voidable); see also Preston, supra 
note 70, at 584 (speculating that if social media sites and other online services were to allow 
users to partially negotiate the terms, then the issue of awareness and notice of the terms 
would be alleviated and potential users would be given some bargaining power, which 
would then alleviate potential unconscionability). 
88 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (finding that the service Spa Petite provides to the 
customer is not an essential service, rather it is a service that could be received at another 
gym); see also Anderson v. McOskar Enterprises, Inc., 712 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2006) (reiterating that a gym service is not service that is a public necessity). 
89 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (demonstrating that services that are necessities are 
generally those that are regulated by the government in some capacity or another, such as 
police and fire departments; gym memberships are not a service regulated by the 
government); see also Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass 
Market Standard Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate:  The Fine Print, Vanishing 
Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 383 (2014) (admitting that some 
jurisdictions have different elements for what constitutes an adhesion contract, and one 
example is in Maryland, which states that contracts of adhesion are generally those whose 
nature is essential to society). 
90 See Pinch, supra note 14, at 547–48 (grouping digital assets as property will allow for a 
clearer understanding for estate planning attorneys and their clients in planning for the 
future of their digital assets and life on social media).  However, Facebook provides several 
options that allow an individual user or a user’s estate executor the ability to choose what 
will happen after the user’s death, such as having the account deleted or memorialized.  What 
Would Happen to My Account if I Pass, FACEBOOK (Feb. 2015), https://www.facebook.com/ 
help/103897939701143 [https://perma.cc/SSP4-XGNR].  Deleting an account is possible 
through a setting in the privacy section on Facebook.  Id.  Memorializing an account for a 
deceased individual is done through a request submitted to Facebook by a family member 
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Tourette, where a subcontract agreement was created to deliver mail from 
one town to another numerous times, held that the contract was not 
personal property.91  The court reasoned that personal property is 
something where value is determined and the owner has interest in the 
property ownership.92 
Conversely, a contract is not regarded as personal property even 
though a contract may hold value to the parties involved; personal 
property is the value in the thing itself.93  In Meek v. State, the court held 
that personal property generally means the valuable right in the item itself 
or in the value of the interest in the item.94  The court stated that property 
                                                
or friend.  Memorialization Request, FACEBOOK (2016), https://www.facebook.com/help/ 
contact/1605213279719667 [https://perma.cc/3MJ3-57QW]. 
91 See 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961) (qualifying that the contract was for a personal 
service contracted for by a woman when she moved from one town to another in Indiana).  
Here, the contract for a personal service is a subset of personal property while the contract is 
still valid and in use by both parties.  Id.  Once one of the two parties to the contract dies, the 
contract is no longer in use or enforceable, and can no longer be considered personal 
property.  Id.  Here, the contract ceased when the woman passed away, and there was no 
need for the mail to be delivered from one location to the next.  Id. 
92 See id. (proving that a contract is not personal property because once a party to the 
contract dies, there is no longer any value in the contract to be considered personal property); 
see also Personal Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “personal 
property” as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not 
classified as real property”). 
93 See Nelson, 178 N.E.2d at 68 (holding that a contract is not an item of personal property, 
but can be subject to an item of personal property belonging to an individual).  But see IND. 
CODE § 32-17-14-3(11) (2016) (establishing that property is “any present or future interest in 
real property, intangible personal property, or tangible personal property”); § 32-17-14-3(4) 
(defining intangible personal property as “incorporeal property, such as money, credits, 
shares of stock, bonds, notes, other evidences of indebtedness, and other evidence of 
property interests”).  These definitions provide that personal property is something that is 
movable in nature at the time of sale.  § 32-17-14-3(4).  See also Meek v. State, 185 N.E. 899, 
901 (Ind. 1933) (stating when it is possible for a contract to be personal property based on the 
value of the contract); How Do I Save a Photo to My Phone or Computer, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/155361567863444 [https://perma.cc/L4RZ-9LG8] 
(declaring that Facebook provides a way for users or loved ones to save pictures without 
obtaining access to the profile). 
94 See 185 N.E. at 901 (defining how to determine if an item is personal property based on 
the ability to assign a value to the item).  The Indiana Supreme Court found that there was a 
dispute over what was to be considered personal property of an individual and decided that 
the decision came down to the control over the object.  Id.  In Meek, the court held that a 
widow had control over her husband’s deceased body after it was stolen from its grave.  Id.  
See also Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“personal property 
includes not only the property itself but all of the owner’s rights and interests in that 
property”); Wolf v. Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 89, 90 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (demonstrating that a U.S. 
Savings Bond purchased jointly with the deceased ex-husband was the personal property of 
the wife and the ex-husband jointly). 
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rights in some objects may be more limited than others depending on the 
interest in the object of the owner.95 
Furthermore, property is classified as something which is not 
movable, a house or land, or something of a physical nature, a car or 
livestock.96  In Low v. LinkedIn, the account holder challenged the personal 
property right, claiming the browsing history within the social media site 
was the personal property of the account holder.97  Account holders 
argued their search history was valuable and identifiable to their 
particular account and it constituted a property ownership right.98  The 
court did not agree and held that Low failed to show that LinkedIn took 
control and interest in the browse history, which led to the browse history 
                                                
95 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (giving the exception to the control rule to determine the 
ownership of property and if the object is property overall); see also IND. CODE § 32-17-14-
3(11) (defining personal property, and among the types listed in the statute, social media 
cannot fall into any of the categories of personal property). 
96 See Nelson, 178 N.E.2d at 68 (listing items which are considered property based on some 
characteristics associated with property, such as it being physical and non-movable); see also 
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017–18 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (providing that in Low, 
the traditional idea of what constituted personal property was proposed to be altered to 
include the browse history of a social media account into the category of personal property 
of an individual); cf. Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 864 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(expressing that when an asset is the personal property of the individual, the loss of that 
property will result in loss of complete control over the property, not just the loss of value of 
the property).  In Claridge, the plaintiff claimed he had lost property value in his personal 
information when the RockYou software he used was hacked into and lost.  785 F. Supp. 2d 
at 858.  The RockYou software required the plaintiff to provide email and social media 
account passwords when purchasing the software, and the plaintiff claimed that this 
constituted ownership, making the software the personal property of the plaintiff.  Id. 
97 See 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (proposing that a social media outlet may constitute personal 
property through the user typing in individual names in the search history); cf. Jaweed 
Kaleem, Death on Facebook Now Common as “Dead Profiles” Create Vast Virtual Cemetery, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/07/death-
facebook-dead-profiles_n_2245397.html [https://perma.cc/XHL2-2QF9] (providing that 
dead Facebook profiles are being compared to a virtual cemetery because of Facebook’s new 
policy of memorializing accounts of deceased users).  Allowing social media to be accessed, 
like the property of the individual, will make Facebook more susceptible to becoming an 
Internet graveyard to the profiles of the deceased.  Id.  See also Stav Dimitropoulos, Digital 
Immortality:  The Social Media Sites for Dead People, GLOBAL COMMENT (Oct. 6, 2015), 
http://globalcomment.com/digital-immortality-the-social-media-sites-for-dead-people/# 
[https://perma.cc/5SW5-JH2N] (reiterating that Facebook is becoming a sort of Internet 
graveyard to social media accounts of the dead through memorialization). 
98 See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1018 (propositioning that the value in searching for 
something through one’s own ability constitutes the personal property of the user, giving 
the search value solely to the user).  For Low’s view of ownership of the browse history to 
hold true, the court determined that the plaintiff must show that with the invasion and use 
of the browse history on the LinkedIn profiles, there was injury suffered and loss of property 
as a result.  Id.  If there is not a showing of injury, the browse history could not be the personal 
property of the LinkedIn account holder.  Id. 
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not being the personal property of the account holder.99  Providing that 
there is no personal value in contracts of adhesion evidences the need to 
understand the applicable state and federal law.100 
C. Indiana Probate Law and Applicable Federal Law 
Everyone has the freedom to choose the disposition of their property 
after their death.101  As such, individuals may create a will or trust to 
provide for their heirs or descendants after their death.102  After death, an 
individual’s possessions are divided into two categories:  probate and 
non-probate property.103  Contracts tend to fall within the non-probate 
category, passing outside of probate through a will substitute.104  Typical 
contracts under the non-probate category are those that have monetary 
value associated with them, such as life insurance, pay-on-death accounts, 
                                                
99 See id. at 1028 (reasoning that the court found that Low needed to show more to prove 
she had personal value in the browse or search history to lead the court to find that it was 
the personal property of Low).  Personal value in the product is not an element to prove that 
something is property, rather it is the value of the object itself.  Id. 
100 See infra Part II.C (introducing that the applicable Indiana probate law and the federal 
law provides an argument for why contracts of adhesion should not be able to be accessed 
after the death of a contracting party). 
101 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 3 (expressing the American system of 
succession allows an individual to choose what to do with one’s property after death).  A 
traditional probate term and rule, the dead hand control rule, is fundamental to the 
American probate system.  Id. at 1.  Dead hand control allows for the deceased individual to 
govern what is to be done with his or her estate through a will or will substitute.  Id.  See also 
Cahn, supra note 15, at 37 (determining what happens to social media accounts after a user 
dies is a question that has many scholars talking).  Because of this, technology companies are 
taking steps to ensure they and their users are covered and have directives to determine what 
will happen to the accounts after a user dies.  Cahn, supra note 15, at 37.  Twitter will 
deactivate an account after being notified by the personal representative that the user is dead.  
Id.  This is different from Facebook, which provides two options to a user, one in which the 
account is deleted, and second in which the account is memorialized.  Id. 
102 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (stating that the freedom to dispose of an 
individual’s property is done mainly through the means of a will or a trust instrument); see 
also Will, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d. ed. 2006) (defining “will” as “[a] document by which 
a person directs his or her estate to be distributed upon death”); Trust, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (providing that a “trust” is “[t]he right, enforceable solely in 
equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal title”). 
103 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 41 (instructing that property is divided into 
two categories, which will determine how the property is to be divided after the testator’s 
death according to the will or will substitute the decedent leaves behind); see also Probate 
Estate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006) (defining “probate estate” as “[a] decedent’s 
property subject to administration by a personal representative”). 
104 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (establishing that contracts fall within 
the non-probate, will substitute category); see also Nonprobate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d 
ed. 2006) (quoting the definition of “nonprobate” as “[o]f or relating to some method of 
transmitting property at death other than by a gift by will”). 
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inter vivos trusts, and joint tenancies.105  On the other hand, contracts that 
have yet to be completed by the deceased at the time of death forward the 
obligation to the personal representative to continue and perform the 
contract to its fulfillment.106  However, the law is not clear if social media 
contracts pass under non-probate or are contracts that bring an obligation 
upon the personal representative of the an estate to fulfill the contracted 
terms.107 
Accessing social media accounts is not only governed by the law of 
the state where the deceased individual died, but also the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) and the Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Accounts Act (“UFADAA”), both federal acts.108  The SCA 
provides criminal liability for unauthorized access to stored electronic 
information or communications systems.109  Criminal liability will arise 
when there is intentional access without authorization, or if the individual 
“intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility.”110  The SCA 
                                                
105 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (introducing examples of non-probate 
contracts that are will substitutes).  All of these will substitutes are created through a 
contract, but the contract created is a traditional contract, not a contract of adhesion, like 
social media accounts.  Id. 
106 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-13 (2016) (instructing the personal representative that if at the 
time of the deceased’s death he or she was under a contractual obligation, the personal 
representative must carry out the terms of the contract to its fulfillment); see also Michael J. 
Milazzo, Facebook, Privacy, and Reasonable Notice:  The Public Policy Problems with Facebook’s 
Current Sign-Up Process and How to Remedy the Legal Issues, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 
682 (2014) (depending on if the contract is completed or terminated, the outcome of the 
contract is determined if the parties complete the contract or terminate it for whatever 
reason). 
107 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 42 (expressing that there are certain 
contracts that fall within the non-probate category and do not pass through probate); see also 
§ 29-1-13-13 (proving that there is time when a contract is to be carried out by a personal 
representative of a deceased’s estate, that time being if there is a remaining obligation to the 
other party in the contract which had yet to be fully completed at the time of death of the 
deceased). 
108 See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (explaining the offense, which is punishable if a fiduciary 
unlawfully accesses the deceased individual’s account without properly obtaining 
permission from the court or through other means); see also Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets Act (“UFADAA”), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (expressing that the 
purpose of the Act is to give the fiduciary access to the electronically stored information of 
the deceased without violating the privacy or the Terms of Service provided by the social 
media site). 
109 See § 2701 (providing criminal consequences to personal representatives who try to 
obtain or do obtain access to the electronic information without proceeding through the 
proper channels to gain lawful permission to access the social media account). 
110 See id. (issuing that for criminal liability to be found, an individual must intentionally 
access or exceed the access to the facility without authorization).  In addition, the access must 
result in obtaining, altering, or preventing access to the communication service and the 
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provides an exception to criminal liability for persons or entities who 
provide “wire or electronic communications services.”111  It is through the 
SCA that intentional, disallowed access to a social media account by a 
personal representative not only breaches privacy, but also potentially 
imposes criminal liability.112 
However, the SCA does not specifically mention social media 
accounts, but the UFADAA does reference digital assets, which is the 
category that social media falls under.113  Section four of the UFADAA 
gives the default power of the deceased’s digital asset to the personal 
representative and determines the distinction between the digital assets 
that are governed under the UFADAA and the electronic communications 
that are governed under the SCA.114  Section four has three subsections 
                                                
electronic storage devices.  Id.  See also Bonazzo, supra note 77 (indicating that access could 
be given, but it must be done prior to the death of the user or the personal representative, 
the third party, will face criminal liability). 
111 See § 2701 (differentiating that there are examples as to when access under the Stored 
Communications Act (“SCA”) is lawful and will not result in criminal liability).  Other 
examples of lawful access would be conduct by the user of that service, or access provided 
within sections 2703, 2704, or 2518.  Id.  See also Dan Bates, The Facebook WILL:  Social Network 
Adds Feature That Lets a Dedicated ‘Legacy Contact’ Edit Your Page After You Die, DAILY MAIL 
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2950806/The-Facebook-
Social-network-adds-feature-lets-dedicated-Legacy-Contact-edit-page-die.html 
[https://perma.cc/PD7S-VX8Z] (providing a lawful way for an individual to access the 
account after the death of the original user).  The legacy feature on Facebook acts as a will 
for an individual’s Facebook account.  Id.  The Legacy Contact will make the decision as to 
whether to leave the account as it is, delete it, or memorialize the account.  Id.  The major risk 
with leaving the account as it is, with the access, would be allowing people to believe the 
deceased user is in fact alive.  Id. 
112 See § 2701 (indicating that there are other, more serious potential consequences than a 
deceased user’s privacy being violated); see also Milazzo, supra note 106, at 662 (defining 
privacy as “the freedom from unauthorized intrusion”). 
113 See § 2702 (providing the guidelines for disclosing electronically stored information 
either with the permission of the user or without the permission of the user); see also Jeehyeon 
(Jenny) Lee, Death and Live Feeds:  Privacy Protection in Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 2015 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 654, 665 (2015) (expressing that public communication providers are 
prohibited from giving out the electronic communications that are stored within them, 
unless one of the specific exemptions within § 2702(b) applies); Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets Act § 4, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/ 
docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (outlining that the personal representative of the decedent’s 
estate is permitted access to the electronically stored information that is disclosed in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b) through a court order or by authorization through the decedent’s will).  This section 
of the UFADAA is subject to § 8(b), which provides limits to the fiduciary’s access to the 
digital asset.  Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4. 
114 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (establishing that there are certain guidelines that a personal 
representative must abide by if trying to gain access to a digital asset); see also Glaberson, 
supra note 76 (clarifying that Facebook has certain procedures in place for the Legacy Contact 
to be established, such as once the user nominates the Legacy Contact, a message will be sent 
to the nominated individual and he or she must agree to be the Legacy Contact). 
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that break the covered content into the content protected under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2702(b):  any electronically stored information received or sent by the 
deceased and any other digital asset of the deceased.115  The digital asset 
content and the electronically stored information is then limited by the 
Terms of Service agreement that the user agrees to when signing up for 
the service.116 
Additionally, Indiana is one of six states that currently have a statute 
facilitating a procedure for the deceased’s personal representatives to 
access electronically stored documents and information, including any 
digital assets that are stored online.117  The personal representative may 
submit a written request to the parent site along with letters testamentary 
to gain access to the document and information.118  Further, the personal 
representative may have to go through the court in the jurisdiction where 
the deceased died to request access from the parent site for the documents 
or information sought.119  Currently, the Indiana Legislature has a 
definition that would define electronically stored information and 
documents, which would further allow the personal representative to 
access the electronically stored information without the access requested 
by the social media parent site.120  At the state level, this statute governs 
                                                
115 See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 4 (verifying that the content 
protected by the UFADAA is “(1) the content of an electronic communication that the 
custodian is permitted to disclose under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. Section 2702(b) [as amended]; (2) any catalogue of electronic communications sent or 
received by the decedent; and (3) any other digital asset in which at death the decedent had 
a right or interest”). 
116 See id. (detailing that the Terms of Service are among several governing terms that can 
limit the access a fiduciary is allowed).  The two other listed limiting factors in this section of 
the UFADAA are copyright law and any other applicable law that would limit the fiduciary’s 
power to access the account.  Id. 
117 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (providing the Indiana statute that allows for access 
to electronically stored information); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 830 (providing that the 
five other states that have similar statutes are:  Connecticut, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Idaho, 
and Delaware). 
118 See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (establishing the required materials that must be submitted to the 
custodian of the digital asset sought according to the statute discussed through this Note); 
see also James Rogers, Widow Wins Battle with Apple over Deceased Husband’s Password, FOX 
NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/01/20/widow-wins-battle-
with-apple-over-deceased-husbands-password.html [https://perma.cc/96MJ-PQHF] 
(providing an example from Canada where a wife was required by Apple to submit proof of 
her inheriting everything belonging to her deceased husband, as well as a court order 
dictating to Apple that it was to release the password to her deceased husband’s iTunes 
account). 
119 See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (contrasting the two ways a personal representative may access the 
electronically stored information or documents, one through a court order and the other 
through letters testamentary, along with the request to the custodian site). 
120 See S. 119-253, 2nd Sess., at 2–3 (Ind. 2016) (amending the statute discussed in this Note, 
IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1, to define electronic communications and digital assets).  The 
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how a personal representative may gain access to digital assets, but federal 
law must be consulted before a personal representative may have 
access.121  At this moment, the Indiana statute allows for access without 
regard to the contract.122  However, the statute must consider relevant 
contract and federal law to determine that personal representative access 
under the current Indiana statute would be in violation of the law.123 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Social media has been in existence since 1997, and in 2016, the term 
“social media,” as applied to estate succession, was yet to be cogently and 
cohesively defined by Indiana law.124  Determining the inheritability of 
social media accounts is the new legal frontier, because currently a 
personal representative is permitted to improperly and unlawfully gain 
                                                
amended statute is effective as of July 1, 2016, and allows access to the electronic 
communication or digital assets of the deceased individual.  Id.  The exact language of the 
amended statute reads: 
IC 32-39-2-4 and IC 32-39-2-5 apply to the right of a personal 
representative who is acting on behalf of the estate of a deceased person 
to access:  (1) the content of an electronic communication (as defined in 
IC 32-39-1-6); (2) a catalogue of electronic communications (as defined 
in IC 32-39-1-5); or (3) any other digital asset (as defined in IC 32-39-1-
10); of the deceased person. 
Id. 
121 See § 29-1-13-1.1(b) (indicating that throughout the Indiana statute, there are certain 
steps required for a personal representative to take prior to gaining access to an electronically 
stored document or information of the deceased); cf. Ind. S. 253 at 2–3 (Ind. 2016) (providing 
that the amended statute no longer outlines the procedures a personal representative must 
follow to gain access to the electronic communication or the digital assets).  In the amended 
statute, access is allowed to the personal representative “who is acting on behalf” of the 
deceased’s estate, with no particular extra steps needed before access is granted.  Ind. S. 253 
at 2–3. 
122 See infra Part III.A (urging that through contract law, it can be determined that social 
media access by a personal representative will be in violation of the law and the contract 
created). 
123 See infra Part III.B (finding that to effectively comply with the contract, both common 
law and federal law must be implemented in tangent with the state statute to prohibit access 
to the personal representative). 
124 See § 29-1-13-1.1 (showing that there is no definition of stored electronic 
communications that are applicable under this statute); see also Digital Trends Staff, The 
History of Social Networking, DIGITAL TRENDS (May 14, 2016), http://www.digital 
trends.com/features/the-history-of-social-networking/ [https://perma.cc/UV2H-GRH7] 
(providing that social media began in 1997 with the site SixDegrees.com, but it was not until 
2002 that social media truly took off and became what it is today with Friendster); cf. Ind. S. 
253 at 2–3 (distinguishing that Indiana has proposed a definition to allow digital assets to 
include social media according to Indiana Code § 32-39-1-10). 
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access to the deceased’s social media accounts.125  The Indiana statute 
currently, but incorrectly, permits access to social media accounts without 
consideration to the contract that created the electronically stored 
information or documents.126  To remedy this issue, the statute must be 
amended to exclude any language that allows for any access by the 
personal representative.127  First, Part III.A analyzes why Indiana common 
law and contract law governs the current Indiana law to gain access to 
electronically stored information and documents.128  Then, Part III.B 
explains why under the applicable federal and state law, the current 
                                                
125 See supra Part II.C (focusing that the law and its scholars have not come to a consensus 
as to a definition for digital assets or a category for digital assets, and because of the 
proceeding two, whether or not digital assets are inheritable based on Indiana law); see also 
§ 29-1-13-1.1 (outlining the statute at issue within this Note that allows for a personal 
representative to be allowed access if approved by the custodian after providing the correct 
information).  To gain access to a social media account as the law stands today, a personal 
representative of a deceased’s estate must have correct documentation from the court stating 
that the representative may be allowed access and a death certificate of the account holder.  
§ 29-1-13-1.1.  Once the personal representative has the correct documentation, then the 
individual may contact the social media site to request access to the account of the deceased.  
Id.  This is the process directed by the statute, but a social media site in another state may not 
have to adhere to this standard because of jurisdictional issues.  However, this is not a route 
that will be discussed in this Note.  The statute reads: 
A custodian shall provide to the personal representative of the estate of 
a deceased person, who was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the 
person’s death, access to or copies of any documents or information of 
the deceased person stored electronically by the custodian upon receipt 
by the custodian of:  (1) a written request for access or copies made by 
the personal representative, accompanied by a copy of the death 
certificate and a certified copy of the personal representative’s letters 
testamentary; or (2) an order of a court having probate jurisdiction of 
the deceased person’s estate. 
Id. 
126 See supra Part II.C (clarifying that the Indiana statute for electronically stored 
documents or information does not define specifically what is meant by electronically stored 
information, which allows for a wide range of interpretations). 
127 See infra Part IV (rendering that social media is created through a contract between two 
people for a limited time, a service that is only to last for the lifetime of the profile holder, 
and that the statute should be amended to exclude access because of the contractual makeup 
of the social media account); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (establishing that social media is created through an adhesion contract that 
takes the form of a click-wrap agreement, browse-wrap agreement, or a combination of both 
agreements to bind the user to the terms of condition or service for the particular social media 
site). 
128 See infra Part III.A (discussing social media accounts as contracts of adhesion which can 
be labeled as a cross of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements, and how the contractual 
formation should disallow the access to the personal representative). 
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Indiana statute allowing access to the personal representative is 
unlawful.129 
A. Contract Law Governs to Exclude Access under the Indiana Statute 
Unlike traditional contracts, social media contracts are not 
inheritable.130  A social media contract is limited to the time the user is on 
the social media service or until the user dies.131  Social media contracts 
are valid, enforceable contracts upon clicking “I agree” on the social media 
site because the formation is like a click-wrap or browse-wrap 
agreement.132  As such, these contracts are made between two parties and 
are not to be inherited once the social media user is deceased.133  Social 
media contracts are click-wrap agreements because the contract requires 
the user to click “I agree” before proceeding with the setup of the profile 
or account.134  However, social media contracts do not follow every 
element of a true click-wrap agreement.135  For example, social media sites 
do not list their Terms of Use or service on the same page where the 
agreement button is located.136  The Terms of Use or service are usually on 
another webpage accessible through a hyperlink near the agreement 
                                                
129 See infra Part III.B (addressing that the current state of the statute, which defines social 
media as a digital asset, an electronically stored information or document, does not comply 
with federal and state law that governs the contract and the ability to access that contract). 
130 See Nelson v. La Tourrette, 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (1961) (providing that a contract for a 
service terminated at the death of one of the parties to the contract).  While the contract in 
Nelson was for a delivery service, a comparison may be drawn, because the service was not 
for an essential service, rather one for convenience.  Id.  Like the contract in Nelson, social 
media is not an essential service.  Id. 
131 See supra Part II.B (concluding the contract of adhesion for social media will terminate 
after the death of the user who contracted for the service, such as Facebook). 
132 See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing that once 
a user clicks “I agree” there is a binding contract between the user and the social media site, 
and courts routinely uphold adhesion contracts as valid and not unconscionable). 
133 See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (establishing that 
even when a personal representative had a part in creating the contract to the digital asset, 
here an email account, access to that email account after the sole user’s death was not allowed 
by the court). 
134 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (stating that the assenting Facebook user must click 
“Sign Up” to agree to the terms Facebook provides, but are not provided the Terms of Service 
directly on the page).  Facebook provides the Terms of Use on another page that is 
hyperlinked on the agreement page, which a new user can click to review before agreeing, 
but it is not required.  Id. 
135 See id. (expressing that Facebook is a combination of the two agreements, click-wrap 
and browse-wrap, and thus, form a valid adhesion contract that is not unconscionable 
because the user has the ability to go to another social media site to get the same service). 
136 See id. (detailing the particular way social media creates a binding contract through the 
contract of adhesion and the agreements within this type of contract).  The Terms of Use of 
Facebook are hyperlinked to a different page on Facebook’s website.  Id. 
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button, which must be clicked to agree to the contract for the social media 
site.137  The social media site assumes a new user will click the hyperlink 
to the Terms of Use or service before clicking agree, but that is not what 
everyone does.138  Many times the individual clicks the agreement button 
without reading the terms.139  However, failing to read the terms does not 
make the contract between the two parties null and void; rather, the 
agreement button is the digital signature and thus, binding.140 
Moreover, Facebook does not follow the true legal definition of a click-
wrap agreement; however, this fact does not take away the legal 
significance it provides for the social media site and the user.141  What sets 
Facebook’s agreement apart and allows it to be considered a partial click-
wrap agreement is that the social media site provides the Terms of Use in 
a link near or below the “Click to Agree” button.142  Creating a link to the 
Terms of Use is Facebook applying another form of contracting on the 
Internet, the browse-wrap agreement.143 
                                                
137 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (describing the location of the hyperlink in relation to 
the agree button to ensure the combination of the click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements 
will be held valid).  The hyperlink would provide proper notice to the user of the Terms of 
Use or Service that must be agreed to before using, as well as what terms the user will be 
held to when using the social media site for its social networking capabilities.  Id. 
138 See id. (placing that where the terms of conditions are located provides adequate notice 
to the user, and whether the user actually reads the hyperlinked terms does not negate the 
validity of the contract). 
139 See id. (clicking agree without reading does not invalidate the agreement or the 
adhesion contract for the contracted service). 
140 See id. (accepting the terms by clicking agree means the terms of the contract have been 
accepted by the new user).  The Terms of Service for Facebook can be accessed anytime once 
a user signs up for the social media service, even if the user does not read the terms prior to 
signing up with the social media site.  Id. 
141 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (establishing that Facebook in particular does not form 
the traditional click-wrap or browse-wrap agreement, but that does not take away from the 
validity and enforceability); see also Banta, supra note 7, at 823 (drawing that many states are 
viewing social media contracts as a form of a digital asset and as personal property, which 
has a right to be inherited).  In fact, social media account contracts are some of the first 
contracts to prohibit transfer of the personal property, rather than to promote social media 
as a form of personal property which can be transferred to another owner.  Banta, supra note 
7, at 823. 
142 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (marking the unique set up of Facebook’s agreement 
with its users is a combination of both click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements and is 
binding to hold the users to the terms within the agreement); see also FACEBOOK, supra note 
32 (focusing on the terms that are linked on Facebook’s website and are available anytime a 
user wishes to re-read and re-learn the terms he or she had previously agreed to when 
signing up for Facebook). 
143 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 837 (demonstrating the way Facebook uses its Terms of 
Service to bind its users through the placement in a link to the corresponding Terms of 
Service page).  This process Facebook uses is correct and binds its users to its terms even 
though the users may not fully read the terms before clicking “I agree” to proceed through 
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Social media accounts are contracts, like the contract in Schlobohm, and 
are standardized contracts drafted by the networking site wanting to 
impose the contract on the other party.144  Social media sites, like 
Facebook, allow the potential new user wanting the service to either 
accept or reject the contract; this is referred to as a take it or leave it 
contract.145  If the potential new user rejects the Terms of Use, the potential 
new user chooses not to participate in the social networking site.146  
However, with social media accounts created through contracts of 
adhesion, challenges arise because of the formation of the contract, such 
as unconscionability.147 
The limitations that social media contracts place on the new user may 
seem harsh, limiting, or even unconscionable.148  The Terms of Use of the 
social media site are not too unjust or unreasonable to create substantive 
unconscionability because the terms are the same terms and conditions 
that every member must agree to before registering for the service.149  For 
the social media contract to be procedurally unconscionable, first the user 
would have to show that the agreement outlined in the Terms of Use of 
                                                
the setup process. See also FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (providing the exact terms that the user 
agrees to when signing up for Facebook). 
144 See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 925–26 (Minn. 1982) (cautioning that 
there is no bargaining in social media contracts, with the social media site holding the power 
over the new potential user, the weaker party).  The gym membership in Schlobohm was a 
valid contract of adhesion with no disparity of bargaining power, and the gym membership 
was not an essential service for the public.  Id.  See also Tender Loving Care Mgmt., Inc. v. 
Sherls, 14 N.E.3d 67, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (following the definition of an adhesion contract 
based on the decision in Sandford v. Castleton Heath Care Center, LLC); Sandford v. 
Castleton Health Care Ctr., LLC, 813 N.E.2d 411, 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (determining that 
a contract of adhesion is valid so long as it is not unconscionable).  
145 See, e.g., Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (stating that the gym membership was a contract 
of adhesion because it was a take it or leave it contract where the potential member either 
signs and accepts the terms or does not sign the contract, leaving that individual to find 
another gym); see also Sandford, 813 N.E.2d at 417 (expressing that the nursing home contract 
was a take it or leave it contract, leaving the client’s family to find another suitable nursing 
home if the family chose to do so). 
146 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (finding that the contract was for a non-essential 
service and was seen by the court as a take it or leave it contract). 
147 See id. at 924–25 (introducing the challenges that may arise through the contract of 
adhesion social media contracts are created from). 
148 See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007)  (detailing that for an adhesion contract to be unconscionable, the contract 
requires procedural, in the negotiation of the contract, and substantive, in the terms of the 
contract itself, unconscionability). 
149 See id. (directing that for a contract to be unconscionable, there must be (1) procedural 
unconscionability and (2) substantive unconscionability).  Both procedural and substantive 
unconscionability are not required for a finding by a court that a contract of adhesion is 
unconscionable.  Id.  Rather, unconscionability is found on a sliding scale between procedural 
and substantive unconscionability.  Id. 
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the social networking site were unjust and unreasonable and that it was 
not freely negotiated.150  The individual user does not have to use the 
service that the site provides.151  In regards to the ability to negotiate freely 
between the parties, the same argument can be made to the adhesion 
contract being unjust or unreasonable, that if the party does not like the 
Terms of Use of the social media site, the user can freely go to another 
social media site and use its service.152 
Additionally, social media is not an essential service that is required 
to be provided to each individual in society, proving further that social 
media account contracts are conscionable.153  Social media is something 
people choose to be a part of, and it is a service that can be obtained from 
an alternative in a similar capacity.154  As such, social media networks are 
not essential to everyone because the individual seeks them out.155  Social 
                                                
150 See id. (providing how to determine if a contract of adhesion is unconscionable); see also 
Dexter Axle Co. v. Baan USA, Inc., 833 N.E.2d 43, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing the 
elements that must be found for a contract to be unconscionable, whether it is a traditionally 
formed contract or a contract of adhesion); cf. Anderson v. McOskar Enters., Inc., 712 N.W.2d 
796, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the contract for the gym that Anderson entered 
into did not include a disparity in bargaining power, and the contract was for an unnecessary 
service that was not important to be required and provided for public welfare). 
151 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (stating that the gym membership was a non-
necessary service and the customer had the choice to walk away or sign the contract with the 
gym for its service). 
152 See id. at 924 (addressing that because the contract for the non-necessary service is a take 
it or leave it contract, if a party wants to negotiate and the terms are final, then the customer 
will have to go to find another gym). 
153 See id. at 926 (determining that the contract for the gym membership at Spa Petite was 
an adhesion contract for a non-essential service, which does not need to be subject to 
regulation because the service is one that is valuable, but does not need to be provided by 
the public if someone cannot afford to gain access to it); see also Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 
(holding that the contract between Anderson and Curves was an adhesion contract for a non-
essential service, a gym membership, and that it was valid and conscionable because while 
there may have been a disparity in the bargaining power on the part of Anderson, she had 
an option to leave Curves and go to another gym to get the same services she could receive 
at Curves).  Social media can be compared to a gym membership, like in Schlobohm and 
Anderson, where the Supreme Court of Minnesota found that a gym membership is not an 
essential service to the public and that it is not so essential that the public should regulate it.  
Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802. 
154 See Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (stating that in both Schlobohm and Anderson, a gym 
service was determined to not be an essential service that both Schlobohm and Anderson 
could have obtained from another gym); see also Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (issuing that 
the gym membership was a conscionable adhesion contract like the one in Anderson, which 
modeled its decision after Schlobohm). 
155 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 925 (highlighting that essential services are services such 
as:  visiting doctors, hospitals, and public works or utilities).  Social media is not an essential 
service that must be provided to each individual to live a healthy and socially acceptable life.  
Id. 
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media is not so essential that the public regulates it.156  While social media 
is a service desired by most individuals, it is a service with reasonable 
alternatives; there is not just one social media site.157  The lack of 
bargaining power on behalf of the potential new user to the social media 
site may seem like the contract is being imposed on the party; that the take 
it or leave it nature of the contract is too harsh for a communication 
service.158  The harsh enforcement and lack of alternatives creates the 
notion that the agreement is unconscionable, but the lack of exact 
alternatives does not create unconscionability.159 
However, as illustrated in Anderson, social media may be an essential 
service that everyone should have an opportunity to participate in, and 
thereby, contracts of adhesion would be unconscionable.160  The take it or 
leave it nature of social media agreements is too harsh for a service that is 
essential to all people.161  With the heavy reliance on social media today, 
it can be readily seen that this view has the proper support to be true.162  
But, what it lacks is the essential nature to be regulated, which is a factor 
necessary to be an essential service.163  There is not a committee or public 
                                                
156 See id. at 926 (comparing social media to the gym service in Schlobohm to illustrate that 
while a social media service may be nice to have, it is not required for a person as a member 
of society, just like a gym membership). 
157 See, e.g., Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (remarking that a gym membership is a service 
desired by many people, but it is not one essential to the public welfare that would lead to 
an unconscionable contract of adhesion). 
158 See Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567 CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 27, 2007) (exacting that there are certain aspects of the contract that may be 
considered unreasonable because they are being imposed on the user, and this imposing 
nature will result in the contract of adhesion being unconscionable); see also Weaver v. Am. 
Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1971) (providing an illustration of an unconscionable adhesion 
contract, one that is not for social media service, but is a valid example of how to determine 
if the social media contract is unconscionable based on the imposing nature of the contract). 
159 See Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (illustrating that bargaining power and the disparity 
in the bargaining power may create unconscionability, but there needs to be more). 
160 See Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (examining that social media is not a service that must 
be provided and the lack of exact alternatives is acceptable because it is not an essential 
service through showing examples, which are essential services). 
161 But see id. (finding that Anderson did not present to the court any evidence that would 
lead the court to find that there was disparity in bargaining power). 
162 But see Schlobohm, 326 N.W.2d at 926 (determining that some people may find that social 
media may be an essential service because it provides a way to communicate with people 
and that may be the only way to communicate with some friends or family who do not live 
near them). 
163 See id. (regulating a service is a required factor in determining that a service is in fact an 
essential service). 
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official that regulates what is posted on these social media sites.164  The 
social media site regulates what is posted on the site itself.165 
Pictures and posts on social media are not the personal, intangible 
property of the user.166  Because social media is not something that has 
present or future value or is moveable at the time of sale or contracting, it 
is not personal property.167  Social media also has no monetary value to 
associate or label with it.168  Because social media does not have any 
present or future tangible value, and value cannot be interpreted through 
emotional or sentimental value, it cannot be classified as personal 
property.169  To the everyday social media user, there is no tangible value 
in the pictures, posts, or tweets released on social media by the user.170  
Not only is tangible value important to personal property, for social media 
to be considered personal property, there must be rights within the 
contract that allow the account holder to take ownership.171  The personal, 
                                                
164 See id. (taking that for a service to be essential it must be regulated, and social media is 
not regulated like public works, thus proving it is not essential). 
165 See id. (indicating that contracts that are for the public good have the ability to be 
regulated by an outside source, but social media does not fall within this category because 
social media is a not a contracted service that is for the public good or a necessity); see also 
Anderson, 712 N.W.2d at 802 (inferring that regulating is not done by an outside source, but 
by the social media site itself through the terms and conditions the user agrees to prior to 
using the social media service). 
166 See Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (providing that 
browse history of a social media site, LinkedIn, was not the personal property of the user).  
The inference can be made that if the browse history is not the personal property of the user, 
then the social media site profile of the user is not the personal property of the user.  Id. 
167 See IND. CODE § 32-17-14-3(11) (2016) (providing the definition of the term property).  
The direct language from the statute states “[p]roperty means any present or future interest 
in real property, intangible personal property, or tangible personal property.  The term 
includes . . . (C) a right to receive performance remaining due under a contract . . . .”  Id.  See 
also Lowrance v. Lowrance, 182 N.E. 273, 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1932) (defining personal property 
as “property of a personal or movable nature as opposed to property of a local or immovable 
character”). 
168 See Meek v. State, 185 N.E. 899, 901 (Ind. 1933) (verifying that for an object or item to be 
personal property, there must be some monetary value to the item, and social media for the 
everyday individual does not have monetary value). 
169 See id. (determining that value cannot be the emotional value, such as the pictures and 
posts on Facebook or any other social media site; the value must be monetary and calculable). 
170 See § 32-17-14-3(11) (defining personal property, and among the types listed in the 
statute, social media cannot fall into any of those categories to be considered personal 
property).  The actual language of the statute defining personal property indicates 
“[i]ntangible personal property means incorporeal property, such as money, deposits, 
credits, shares of stock, bonds, notes, other evidences of indebtedness, and other evidences 
of property interests.”  Id. 
171 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (finding that where there is control over an inanimate object, 
there is a property right in the object); see also Browning v. Walters, 616 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that personal property includes the owner’s rights in the 
property, as well as the value). 
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emotional value in the pictures, posts, and tweets to the individual social 
media user would make the argument difficult.172  Personal, emotional 
value does not create a property right that is statutorily needed to create a 
property right.173  The idea is hard to sell because personal property is not 
statutorily defined using emotion, even though property can often be 
more than just physical.174 
Nevertheless, a valid contract can be considered the personal property 
of the parties to the contract, but this is not the case for social media 
account contracts.175  Under this rationale, each post, picture, or tweet 
from social media should be protected by the contract and considered 
personal property.176  A valid adhesion contract makes everything posted 
the personal property of the user, because the subject matter of the 
contract is regarded as personal property.177  Defining contracts, as subject 
matter to personal property, would lead to social media accounts being 
inheritable once the account holder dies.178  The Indiana statute, under this 
                                                
172 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (stating that the definition of personal property does not 
include the emotional value of pictures or posts that could be saved to someone’s computer 
if they choose to do so); see also § 32-17-14-3(11) (providing the statutory definition as to what 
constitutes personal property of an individual in Indiana). 
173 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (reiterating that value is found in the property itself, not in the 
value the owner gives the object or piece of property). 
174 See § 32-17-14-3(11) (providing the statutory definition of personal property and 
intangible property to understand that contracts may fit within the definition but it takes a 
particular contract to do so, one that is for a tangible item); see, e.g., Dept. of Fin. Insts. v. Holt, 
108 N.E.2d 629, 634 (Ind. 1952) (finding that property is more than the physical objects people 
own, which includes valid contracts). 
175 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (inferring the possibility that a contract may be personal 
property); see also Wolf v. Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 89, 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1970) (asserting that a 
contract is personal property when it is used as the subject to a property relationship); Nelson 
v. La Tourrette, 178 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that a contract is only a form 
of property when it is an item as a subject to a personal property relationship). 
176 See, e.g., Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91 (considering that the Terms of Use of a social media site 
include the pictures and posts of the user, so the pictures and posts would be considered 
property). 
177 See supra Part II.B (examining the possibility that the adhesion contract created through 
signing up for social media may create a property right in itself); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 
92 (validating the contract allows all the posts, pictures, or verbal language to be considered 
personal property of the user because the terms and conditions of the social media site 
regulate the posts and pictures, which are permitted to be posted on the social media site). 
178 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (concluding that there are certain ways in which the contract 
of an individual may be the personal property of the parties to the contract); but see Low v. 
LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (differentiating that the browse 
history for a social media site was not the personal property of the user). 
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idea, would be effective in allowing social media accounts to be accessed 
by a personal representative of the deceased.179 
Contracts do not create a property right in themselves because the 
social media account does not have a property right in the contract, which 
leads to the social media account not being the personal property of the 
deceased.180  However, personal property is established through contracts 
by making the contract the subject matter to the personal property.181  
Using this interpretation, social media accounts could be considered 
personal property of the user or owner.182  The user enters into a contract 
for social networking purposes, and when the profile descends or is 
inherited by an heir, it is the account the heir is inheriting, not the contract 
for the account.183  According to Wolf, social media accounts could be 
considered personal property of the user and owner of the account, which 
would allow the owner to pass the account to a future heir, but this is not 
the correct view.184  Social media is not defined as personal property or as 
a contract.185  However, it has yet to be determined if personal property is 
the appropriate category for social media, a subset of digital assets, which 
                                                
179 See, e.g., § 29-1-13-1.1 (establishing what the statute currently states in regards to 
inheriting and the personal representative gaining access to digital assets after an account 
holder’s death). 
180 See Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1029 (conceding that a contract does not by itself create a 
valuable right in itself that would allow for the contract to be considered personal property); 
see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91 (presenting that social media is a contract that does not create 
a property right in itself). 
181 See § 29-1-13-13 (considering how to make a contract the personal property of the 
contracted parties, and if one party dies, how the contract can be passed to the personal 
representative to fulfill the contract); see, e.g., Wolf, 259 N.E.2d 91–92 (observing that a 
contract can have property rights in it by making the contract the term to a property right). 
182 See supra Part II.B (detailing that there are two options on how to view social media, as 
a contract or as a personal property interest); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 91–92 (inferring that 
through seeing a social media contract as property, it is by making the contract itself the term 
of the property, the social media profile becomes the property of the user; everything posted 
on the profile would, too, become the property of the owner). 
183 See Meek, 185 N.E. at 901 (drawing the counterview to this Note, which would make 
social media an item of personal property that is descendible); see also Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 92 
(noting that the contract entered by the individual for the social media service should be 
considered the subject matter to define the personal property, the profile and everything 
posted or said on the social media profile). 
184 See Wolf, 259 N.E.2d at 92 (modeling social media contracts as property by using the 
contracts for bonds to be the model and guide).  This is the favored view of social media as 
personal property.  It is through this view that allowing a personal representative to access 
the accounts after the user’s death would not conflict with the common law of the state. 
185 See § 29-1-13-1.1 (validating that there is no definition that applies to digital assets 
within the statute that would indicate social media’s status as a contract or as the personal 
property of the user).  Once again, this statute has current legislation that amends and 
provides a definition of digital assets to the current language to define electronically stored 
information.  Id. 
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many scholars today define social media as, and allows for access.186  The 
Indiana statute, Section 29-1-13-1.1, improperly allows personal 
representatives to access social media, which does not comply with 
federal and state law.187 
B. Federal and State Law 
Social media’s purpose is for the living generation to communicate 
freely with the user’s friends and family, both near and far, not for a 
personal representative to access and keep up as his or her own.188  By 
requiring agreement to the terms before proceeding onto the social media 
site, Facebook creates a contract between itself and the new user before 
the user can use the social media service.189  Although the deceased’s 
contract can occasionally be fulfilled by a personal representative if the 
service or purpose of the contract has yet to be fully satisfied, this is not 
possible with social media contracts.190  Here, the contract violated by a 
third party is a contract of adhesion.191  Fundamentally, contracts of 
adhesion are different in nature than those of traditionally conceived 
contracts, because contracts of adhesion force the user to agree to the terms 
of the site, which is exactly what social media has done.192  For instance, 
Facebook has terms in its service agreement prohibiting the user from 
                                                
186 See Pinch, supra note 14, at 547 (providing that the status of digital assets as property is 
unknown and undefined).  While many scholars have taken the route in deciding that social 
media is the personal property of the user, there has been little to substantiate that definition.  
Id. 
187 See § 29-1-13-1.1 (expressing that if the appropriate federal and state law was applied to 
the statute, access to personal representatives to social media accounts of the deceased user 
would not be allowed, and the contract would terminate at the death of the user). 
188 See supra Part II.A (detailing the purpose of social media, that it is for those who are 
alive to communicate and keep in contact with loved ones, both near and far, and to connect 
with people they may not have had a chance to communicate with across the world). 
189 See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (confirming that 
social media is a contract, how the contract is formed, and what type of contract it is); see also 
Zaltz v. JDate, 952 F. Supp. 2d 439, 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (qualifying that the contract must be 
agreed upon and how to agree to the contract). 
190 See § 29-1-13-13 (identifying that there is a way for contracts to be taken over by the 
personal representative and what these types of contracts are for). 
191 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (applying that Facebook creates a contract of adhesion 
through combining two different forms of Internet adhesion contracts, click-wrap and 
browse-wrap, to create the binding agreement for the social media site).  It is through the 
Terms of Service agreement for Facebook that the user must agree to, which creates the 
adhesion contract that binds the user to Facebook.  Id. 
192 See Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 920, 924 (Minn. 1982) (reiterating that 
social media contracts are not traditionally formed with elements of offer, acceptance, and 
consideration).  Social media is created through a contract like the one in Schlobohm for a gym 
service.  Id.  While the service being contracted for is different, the lack of ability to bargain 
is the foundation for both contracts.  Id. 
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allowing another individual to transfer the account to anyone else to 
monitor and post from without Facebook’s explicit consent.193 
The Terms of Service is “dead hand control” over the social media site, 
maintaining the user’s wishes to be the sole user of the account with the 
right to post pictures or statuses based on the agreement to the Terms of 
Service.194  Dead hand control goes to the foundation on which our 
probate system is based and furthers the understanding for social media 
contracts’ control over the account of a deceased user.195  If the deceased 
does not leave instructions with his or her permission to access the social 
media account after his or her death, the Terms of Service should be dead 
hand control over the social media site because it was a term agreed to by 
the deceased user.196  No one, including the personal representative, 
should be allowed access to the social media profile on the basis that the 
Terms of Service govern and disallow the personal representative access 
to the account.197  Facebook, and other social media sites, is in the business 
of providing a platform for communication among the living generation; 
it is not an ancestry site.198 
Like traditional contracts, social media accounts create a contractual 
relationship between the user and the social media site, but unlike 
traditional contracts, social media contracts impose the Terms of Use on 
the party seeking the service.199  Terms of adhesion contracts tend to favor 
                                                
193 See FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (pointing out a term within the Facebook Terms of Use 
prohibiting the user from transferring the profile to another without explicit consent from 
Facebook). 
194 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 16, at 1 (applying a traditional probate term and 
rule to a modern issue that would allow the social media site to prevent the personal 
representative from accessing the profile).  With this rule, the social media account belonging 
to a deceased user will cease after the user dies, unless the user has in place a legacy user 
prior to death.  Id. 
195 See id. (reiterating that this is a foundational term and school of thought that is 
constantly upheld by courts and academics alike because it is fundamental to the succession 
of deceased estates). 
196 See id. (pointing out the need to fulfill the wishes of the deceased should always be at 
the forefront of society’s decisions). 
197 See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8(b), UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (providing that access to 
the deceased user’s account should be prohibited to anyone who was not given access by the 
deceased).  Access should be denied based on the federal and state common law that governs 
personal representative access to social media account contracts.  Id. 
198 See Smith, supra note 27 (following that social media sites and accounts are for the living 
generation for communication, and allowing access to a personal representative goes against 
what Facebook is in the business of providing to its users). 
199 See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (reviewing the way 
that social media contracts are formed, through the adhesion contract, and how this type of 
contract is similar and different from traditionally formed contracts); see also Ajemian v. 
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the social media site, which imposes the terms on the weaker party, the 
new user.200  Each social media site has its own Terms of Service or use, 
and the terms are imposed on a new user, which then forms an adhesion 
contract.201 
Fteja affirms that social media contracts create a contract of 
adhesion.202  It is within the terms of the social media site that outline what 
a user can or cannot do with the account.203  The Facebook Terms of 
Service detail the user is the only individual who is authorized to use the 
account and no one else should be given access to the individual’s 
account.204  The terms also state an account will not be transferred to 
another individual, unless Facebook gives explicit permission to the 
account holder, not a third party.205  Facebook’s Terms of Service are 
binding on the personal representative because of the power the 
UFADAA gives to the Terms of Service of each social media site.206  Section 
                                                
Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 614 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (concluding that Internet transactions, 
such as signing up for a Facebook account, which although may be a new variation on 
contracting, it is in fact still a contractual relationship between the user and Facebook.); 
Bradberry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. C06-6567CW, 2007 WL 1241936, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
27, 2007) (defining a contract of adhesion in a cellphone plan as a take it or leave it contract 
with only the opportunity to accept or reject the contract); FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (detailing 
the social media contract for Facebook and the Terms of Use that the site imposes on the new 
user);. 
200 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (showing that the terms of conditions for Facebook are 
imposed upon the new user, and the new user does not have an opportunity to negotiate the 
terms because they are the same terms each user must agree to before using Facebook). 
201 See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the Terms of Service for potential Twitter 
users); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (canvasing the terms to use Facebook and post on the site, 
which each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM, supra 
note 32 (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to Instagram). 
202 See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 835 (inferring that with the terms being provided to the user 
and not allowing the user to negotiate the terms of the contract forms a contract of adhesion 
that favors Facebook in its creation because the terms must simply be agreed to prior to using 
the social media site). 
203 See, e.g., TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the terms for potential Twitter users that each 
must abide by); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (issuing the Terms of Use for Facebook which 
each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM, supra note 32 
(setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to use the site). 
204 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (determining that an individual user is the only one 
who is able to access the account).  The particular term states that, “[y]ou will not share your 
password . . . , let anyone else access your account, or do anything else that might jeopardize 
the security of your account.”  Id. 
205 See, e.g., id. (detailing that the individual user is the only one who is able to contact 
Facebook to request someone else be able to access the Facebook account).  The exact term of 
the Facebook Terms of Service that applies is, “[y]ou will not transfer your account . . . to 
anyone without first getting our [Facebook’s] written permission.”  Id. 
206 See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (supplying that the 
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eight of the UFADAA gives the social media site the ability to govern over 
the fiduciary’s ability to access the digital asset, which would be social 
media, or not allow access based on the Terms of Service of the particular 
social media site.207  The power this section gives to the social media site 
in creating its Terms of Service to ensure the social media site has the 
ability to determine if the personal representative of the deceased is 
allowed access is exponential.208  Providing the social media site the power 
to decide prevents a parent from gaining access to his or her son’s or 
daughter’s Facebook profile and continuing to post pictures or statuses 
after the child’s death.209 
In the Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1, social media is incorrectly 
classified as electronically stored information and documents.210  Not 
allowing the personal representative to access the electronically stored 
document(s) or information of the account holder after his or her death is 
imperative to respecting both federal and common law.211  Allowing the 
personal representative to access the account is a violation of the user’s 
privacy.212  While there is a system to ensure the personal representative 
does his or her duties, the system does not check to ensure the personal 
representative does not take on the identity of the deceased on social 
media.213  Furthermore, allowing the personal representative access is a 
                                                
UFADAA will govern to allow the Terms of Service of the social media site to limit the 
fiduciary’s access to the deceased’s social media profile). 
207 See id. (providing the section that explicitly states what the social media Terms of Use 
and other law will limit the fiduciary’s access to social media and other digital assets). 
208 See id. (noting the power the UFADAA gives to the social media sites to limit the 
fiduciary in gaining access to the social media profile). 
209 See id. (providing an example of why it is important to limit the access to a deceased 
individual’s social media account).  While the UFADAA does not explicitly say access should 
be denied, it relies on the Terms of Service or use of the social media account to determine 
how to gain access and who must agree to allow access to the social media site.  Id. 
210 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (highlighting the terms used within the Indiana 
statute that currently allow social media to be accessed by the personal representative). 
211 See supra Part II.C (detailing the issues that may arise out of the legislation and law that 
currently allows a personal representative the ability to request access to the social media 
account of the deceased individual). 
212 See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (2014), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org1/shared/docs/Fiduciary%20Access%C20to%C20Digital%
Ässets/2014_UFADAA_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XY9-CLLC] (endorsing that the 
UFADAA argues to further the privacy of the social media account holder and the social 
media parent site by relying on the Terms of Service as a contract that the user agrees). 
213 See supra Part II.A (reiterating the hazards of allowing a third party to access the 
information of a contract when the Terms of Use the deceased user agreed upon when 
signing up for the social media service did not allow it); see also Uniform Fiduciary Access to 
Digital Assets Act § 4 (providing that the UFADAA points to the Terms of Service of the 
social media site to alleviate the potential violation of an unverified third party from 
accessing the social media profile of a deceased user). 
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form of identity theft and a breach of the contract.214  By allowing access, 
the law is disregarding the privacy of the user, which is essential to the 
formation of the social media contract.215  Additionally, access to social 
media sites provides extra challenges to the social media parent site to 
ensure personal representatives are not abusing their access privileges 
and the access does not correctly promote respecting human dignity and 
the finality of death of a social media user.216 
Where the language of the statute is clear, it gives too much power to 
the personal representative to gain access.217  While a situation where the 
personal representative takes on the account and operates it as his or her 
own may be unlikely, it should not be disregarded as a possibility.218  The 
current Indiana statute makes this outcome possible; therefore, the statute 
needs to be amended to prevent access by a personal representative to 
social media sites of the deceased user.219 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Defining social media as a contractual relationship, void of property 
rights, would bring the Indiana statute, Indiana Code section 29-1-13-1.1, 
current with terms of social media contracts themselves.220  Social media 
contracts prohibit someone other than the account holder from requesting 
access to the social media account or any documents or information stored 
                                                
214 See supra Part II.C (admitting the potential pitfalls of the Indiana statute allowing a third 
party the ability to access a deceased’s social media). 
215 See Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act § 8 (examining that the Terms of 
Service are essential to the understanding of how a third party may lawfully gain access to 
the social media account); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (acknowledging that the social media contract is a contract of adhesion created through 
the combination of click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements). 
216 See supra Part II.C (lending an understanding of Indiana law and the relevant federal 
law that lends to the lack of understanding for what a digital asset is and how it is to be 
handled after the user dies). 
217 See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) (judging that the current language of the statute gives 
the ability of too much access to the third party if the personal representative follows the 
instructions provided in the current statute). 
218 See A. Smith, supra note 2 (expressing that a third party gaining access to a deceased 
user’s account is possible and the third party did take on using the Facebook profile as her 
own when it belonged to her deceased daughter). 
219 See infra Part IV (asserting that the current statute should be amended to exclude access 
to the personal representatives of the deceased user’s estate, which would lead to the contract 
created being respected). 
220 See supra Part III.B (arguing that the proposed amendment outlined in Part IV would 
provide a clear understanding to the Indiana statute and exclude access to electronically 
stored information and documents by the personal representative). 
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on the social media site.221  By not defining social media accounts as digital 
assets that apply to the category of electronically stored documents or 
information, the Indiana statute will correctly apply fundamental 
principles of contract law, as well as follow what the Terms of Use of the 
social media site set out.222  The current confusion, leading to the improper 
use of the statute, exists because the statute does not define the term 
“electronically stored documents or information,” and as such, the term is 
ambiguous and open to rogue interpretation.223  Therefore, the Indiana 
legislature must amend the statute to exclude access to electronically 
stored documents or information to the personal representative of the 
deceased’s estate.224  To begin, Part IV.A proposes an amendment to 
remove any part of the statute that allows access in violation of contract 
law.225  Then, Part IV.B provides commentary on the proposed 
amendment and responds to anticipated counterarguments.226 
A. Proposed Amendment 
The Indiana Congress should codify the following proposed statute: 
Ind. Code § 29-1-13-1.1 Electronically stored documents 
or information defined; custodians; providing access or 
copies to personal representatives 
 
(a) As used in this section, “custodian” means any 
person who electronically stores the documents or 
information of another person. 
(b) A custodian shall provide to the personal 
representative of the estate of a deceased person, who 
was domiciled in Indiana at the time of the person’s 
death, access to or copies of any documents or 
                                                
221 See, e.g., FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (exploring the power the Terms of Use or Service of a 
social media site gives to the deceased). 
222 See supra Part III.A (supporting that social media is created through a contract between 
two parties, not to be interfered by a third party, when the social media Terms of Use do not 
permit this interference, unless it has been requested by the account holder in particular). 
223 See supra Part III (excluding access to the personal representative is needed to bring the 
statute to a place where it would be able to be applied to case law, if needed). 
224 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1, which would 
exclude access of the personal representative of the deceased’s estate to the user’s 
electronically stored information and documents). 
225 See infra Part IV.A (providing detail about the proposed amendment to IND. CODE § 29-
1-13-1.1). 
226 See infra Part IV.B (giving the commentary to the proposed amendment, as well as the 
critic’s views on the proposed amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1). 
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information of the deceased person stored electronically 
by the custodian upon receipt by the custodian of: 
(1) a written request for access or copies made by the 
personal representative, accompanied by a copy of 
the death certificate and a certified copy of the 
personal representative’s letters testamentary; or 
(2) an order of a court having probate jurisdiction of 
the deceased person’s estate. 
(c) A custodian may not destroy or dispose of the 
electronically stored documents or information of the 
deceased person for two (2) years after the custodian 
receives a request or order under subsection (c). 
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a 
custodian to disclose any information: 
(1) in violation of any applicable federal law; or 
(2) to which the deceased person would not have 
been permitted in the ordinary court of business by 
the custodian.227 
B. Commentary 
The proposed amendment prevents access to social media, which 
currently allows anything stored electronically or online to be accessed by 
a personal representative of a deceased social media user’s estate.228  By 
removing access to the personal representative in the statute, the personal 
representative would be denied access that is currently allowed under the 
statute.229  First, the amendment removes the ability of the personal 
representative to petition for access to a social media account.230  By 
removing access to social media accounts, the amendment allows the 
contract between the deceased user and the social media site to be 
                                                
227 This Note proposes an amendment to IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 prior to the amended 
language effective July 1, 2016.  The normal font is the language of the original statute.  The 
language with a strike through is the language the author wishes to strike from the original 
statute. 
228 See infra Part IV.B (indicating the potential hole in the statute, which would be the lack 
of a full explanation of electronically stored information or documents, and lack of certainty 
which digital assets apply to this definition within this statute). 
229 See supra Part IV.A (introducing an amendment to exclude access to electronically 
stored documents and information by the personal representative of the deceased user’s 
estate, as IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 currently allows the personal representative to do just that). 
230 See supra Part IV.A (giving the advantage of amending the statute to remove the ability 
to petition for access to the social media account of the deceased user). 
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respected.231  Second, the amendment gives the social media platform the 
ability to continue to enforce its terms after the user’s death.232 
Amending section 29-1-13-1.1 will provide a clearer understanding of 
the statute in regards to contract law and how the statute should be 
applied.233  The statute is currently not being used or applied because 
practitioners and scholars are unable to understand its proper application 
to estate planning and which digital assets apply to the statute.  The 
proposed amendment would allow for a social media site, like Facebook, 
to control the outcome of a user’s social media profile, unless the user has 
previously stated what he or she wants to occur to his or her profile after 
death.234  Additionally, the proposed amendment strengthens the 
contractual relationship between the social media site and the user.235  By 
not allowing a third party to access the account after the primary user’s 
death, the contract between the two parties is respected and upheld to the 
terms provided in the Terms of Use or Service.236  The amendment also 
determines social media accounts are not inheritable or descendible 
because an estate of the deceased cannot access them.237 
Critics may view the proposed amended statute as limiting social 
media from being labeled or classified as personal property.238  Their 
argument is likely shrouded by the idea that a social media account is 
                                                
231 See supra Part IV.A (reflecting that the amendment will provide clarity to practitioners 
and scholars on the subject of digital assets and social media in particular, and determining 
if this class has the ability to be inherited or accessed by a personal representative). 
232 See supra Part III.A (providing why the Indiana statute should not apply to social media 
because social media profiles, like Facebook, are formed temporarily and do not have specific 
documents that belong on the profile, which cannot be gained through other means). 
233 See supra Part III (outlining that a definition of social media being considered a 
contractual relationship, not personal property, would clear up the misunderstanding and 
ambiguity of the current state of the Indiana statute at issue in this Note). 
234 See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment, and specifically stating the 
amendment would provide that the contract created by the user and the social media site 
would be controlling after the death of the user); see IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2016) 
(describing that the statute is to be used to allow a representative of the estate to contact a 
custodian of the electronically stored information or documents to request access to the 
deceased’s information or documents in its possession). 
235 See supra Part III.B (stating social media accounts are contracts between two parties). 
236 See supra Part III.A (issuing that the Terms of Use of the social media site create a 
contract and terms that must be followed by the user after assent to the contract when 
proceeding to create the social media profile). 
237 See supra Part III.A (finding that social media accounts are not the personal property of 
the account holder because the account holder does not hold any valuable interest in the 
account that can be then passed on to someone after the account holder’s death). 
238 See supra Part II.B (describing how personal property is defined and how it could 
possibly be applied to social media, but in this Part of the Note, it is construed that social 
media is not personal property); see also § 32-17-14-3(4) (determining that the personal 
property definition provided by this Indiana statute does not include social media as the 
personal property of an individual). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol51/iss1/4
2016] Facebook:  A Digital Asset? 111 
personal property because of the videos, pictures, or words that are posted 
on the social media site.239  This argument may be entertained under the 
false notion that the value of these digital items, if printed or made into a 
physical memento, would hold value and interest to the owner of the 
physical item.240  In the digital form on the social media account, the 
pictures, videos, and posts do not hold the same value.  However, this 
view of transforming digital assets into a physical asset that is personal 
property is not correct.  The form of asset being discussed is the digital 
form, the social media site itself, not the form that may be created after 
taking an item off of the social media site.  The proposed amendment 
would reiterate to individuals reading and applying the statute that there 
is no value or interest in the pictures, posts, and words that are posted on 
Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.241  If the representative of the deceased 
person’s estate wished to have the pictures or posts from the account, by 
going to the account and printing off the pictures, that creates a different 
type of asset.  Printing off the pictures creates tangible, personal property 
assets, which may or may not have value. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute, Barbara 
would no longer be able to access Ashley’s Facebook and other social 
media accounts.  While it is difficult to deny a parent of a deceased child 
access to the account, upholding the contractual relationship between 
Ashley and the social media site follows with the relevant federal and state 
probate law associated with digital assets.  The danger with allowing 
Barbara access is the social media profile or account will no longer be 
                                                
239 See supra Part II.B (drawing a comparison that digital assets of videos, pictures, and 
word documents available through social media may be compared and determined to be 
personal property of the account holder before making them a physical asset).  However, 
this comparison is neither accurate nor made within this Note. 
240 See supra Part II.B (arguing that social media is a contract between the user and the social 
media parent site, not the personal property of the social media user); see also How Do I Save 
a Photo to My Phone or Computer, supra note 93 (providing a way for a user or user’s loved one 
to save the pictures on a profile without obtaining access to the social media account). 
241 See supra Part IV.A (detailing the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute that 
would prevent access to a personal representative of a deceased user to the user’s 
electronically store information or documents); see also TWITTER, supra note 32 (outlining the 
terms Twitter users must abide by); cf. FACEBOOK, supra note 32 (issuing the Terms of Use for 
Facebook that each new user must agree to before using the social media site); INSTAGRAM, 
supra note 32 (setting out the Terms of Use when signing up to use the site).  By posting 
pictures to each of these websites, the user is relinquishing some right and interest in them, 
whether or not they were the personal property of the individual initially.  You, the user, are 
giving the public, who views your pictures, the right to look and even claim them for 
themselves if they choose to do so. 
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associated with the deceased user because a third party will be operating 
the profile.  There is no ownership in the account on behalf of the user, 
Ashley, so the social media account or profile is not the personal property 
of the user.  The account cannot be descendible or inheritable by the 
deceased’s estate. 
The interest the user has in the social media account terminates at 
death.  Although there might be good intentions with allowing a personal 
representative to access a deceased individual’s social media account, the 
legal sense in doing so overrules any good intentions.  Facebook, for 
example, does not allow transfer of account holders by a third party; only 
the original account holder may request transfer with the permission of 
Facebook.  Through the proposed amendment to the Indiana statute, the 
contractual relationship between the two parties is respected and upheld. 
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